To experience the visual spectacle that is Avatar, Chinese audiences have flocked to theaters, with some reportedly paying up to $100 for a ticket. Yet, despite its spectacular success in China, the film has run into some trouble. Authorities have decided to pull the 2-D version of the movie from theaters to make way for a Chinese-made film on the life of Confucius. Why?

Part of the move is undoubtedly aimed at promoting homegrown cultural products at the expense of a formidable foreign competitor. But that can't be the only issue, especially since many Chinese have roundly extolled the film's creative revolution. Take a closer look, and you'll find that it's a quieter, subtler revolution that is unsettling the Chinese government. In Avatar, many Americans see a film about exploitation, militarism, and environmental sustainability. Many Chinese, however, see a cautionary tale about a form of social and economic injustice all too common across their country. To many Chinese bloggers, Avatar is a fable about unscrupulous Chinese officials forcefully evicting residents in the name of local development.

"Land development with an iron fist" has become a volatile issue for Beijing. Driven by rapid urbanization and the absence of property rights, city residents are often uprooted from their homes with little or no compensation to clear the ground for construction of luxurious new high-rises. City enforcement officials, known as "chengguan," are often in cahoots with local developers, granting permits in exchange for kickbacks. Flanked by public security officers, they demand that residents vacate or face removal by force. At times, the ham-fisted moves lead to tragic outcomes, as when a woman in Chengdu set herself on fire rather than be evicted. In another incident, when an elderly man threatened to jump off the roof if he was forcibly removed, a chengguan quipped, "Go straight to the top floor. Don't choose the first or second."

Public outrage at this behavior has run rampant, fueled by the stubbornness of petty officials with unchecked power. In recent years, individuals managed to attract national attention to the issue via iconic and viral images of the "nail house" (usually a single dilapidated shack standing amid razed ground, sticking out like a nail). The photo above tells the story.

These houses remain intact because the owners refuse to budge and chose to fight against developers. On Chinese blogs, commentators immediately recognized the Pandoran aliens Na'vis' tree home as a nail house, and the army that descended upon it as chengguan. Dripping with sarcasm, bloggers' reaction to Avatar as a metaphor for average Chinese woes is unmistakable: "The humans actually failed to successfully evict and demolish [the aliens]? Truly embarrassing. Why didn't they send China's chengguan there sooner?" And "China's demolition crews must go sue old [James] Cameron, sue him for piracy/copyright infringement!" 

With enormous numbers of comments like these moving across the web at lightning speed, Beijing, ever more preoccupied with public opinion on the Internet, grew nervous. Corruption is surely involved in many of the development deals, and it doesn't take much of a leap for the public to shift blame to the central government's inability to weed out corruption as promised. Though most of the ire is usually trained on local officials, the party leadership isn't going to take unnecessary risks. Few things arouse more fear in official circles than the loss of message control-and Avatar is just so popular. They decided they would need a wizened local sage to provide a little ancient wisdom.

Cue Confucius.

Damien Ma is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Asia Practice.

My conversation with colleague and friend Nouriel Roubini continues today on our political and economic expectations for key regions in the year ahead. Today, we talk about Europe.

Bremmer: We're seeing the return of political risk to the Eurozone in a big way, as the line between developed and developing states becomes a little less distinct. Member states' coordination on fiscal policy has been breaking down for awhile, but a sharp economic slowdown has made matters worse. Markets may be underestimating risks of default among the most vulnerable; EU support is something less than a sure thing. Even without a default, governments will respond to economic stagnation with spending meant to prop up vulnerable sectors. As in the United States and China, it's all about jobs, jobs, jobs, and jobs.

In fact, stubbornly high unemployment is an especially serious problem in Eastern Europe, where a host of elections in 2010 could heighten tension and stoke unrest. Upcoming elections in a number of key countries materially increase the likelihood of instability. Nervous policymakers and legislators will face the temptations of channeling the frustration and anger of the unemployed with protectionist, populist, even xenophobic policy plans. Ukraine, Hungary, and Latvia are especially vulnerable, but even Poland could hit some turbulence.

Another issue to worry about: If one of the big Western European banks active in Eastern Europe finds itself in trouble, rescue efforts could become a mess.

Roubini: The recovery of the Eurozone and the rest of the advanced economies in Europe will also be anemic and below trend for several reasons: Potential growth in the Eurozone (2 percent) is lower than in the United States (closer to 3 percent). Most Eurozone economies could not do much counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus as they started -- even before the crisis -- with large fiscal deficits, large stocks of public debt, and financial systems that are both too big to fail and too big to save, because the sovereign does not have the resources to bail them out in case of a systemic crisis. Indeed, sovereign risk is rising in the Eurozone -- currently in Greece and Ireland but soon enough in Spain and other periphery economies. The European Central Bank has followed a tighter monetary policy than the Fed and may exit from low rates and QE sooner, thus hampering the economic recovery. Financial institutions in Europe have not fully recognized the losses on their toxic assets and have large exposure to Central and Eastern Europe, where the economic and financial crisis are not yet over. Moreover, the strength of the euro is hampering the recovery of the Eurozone economies, and the Club Med economies have both a competitiveness and a public debt problem, as nominal wages rising faster than productivity have led to rising unit labor costs, real appreciation, and large external imbalances. Thus, even the viability of the European Monetary Union may be challenged over the next few years.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group. Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of RGE Monitor.

My conversation with colleague and friend Nouriel Roubini continues today on our political and economic expectations for key regions in the year ahead. Today, we move to the Persian Gulf.

Bremmer: It's much smoother sailing this year in the Persian Gulf, despite Dubai's well-publicized troubles and the multiple-front fighting in Yemen. Saudi Arabia is looking especially strong. The oil price rebound has boosted the Saudis more than many other oil producer thanks to its conservative budgetary assumptions, and it looks as though the eventual political succession process will be handled smoothly. Most importantly, the Saudis are realizing the potential of long-neglected sectors, regions, and segments of the population. The socially more liberal Bahrain is doing the same. Abu Dhabi has politically stabilized the UAE.

Roubini: The collapse of oil prices during the global recession led to a massive slowdown of growth in the Middle East, but the recovery of oil prices from a low of $30 in early 2009 to levels ranging from $75-$80 in recent months has triggered a recovery of growth and an improvement of fiscal conditions. Dubai's troubles may reverberate in other parts of the Gulf, where a real estate bubble took place, but they will otherwise be contained. Policymakers throughout the Middle East have the medium- to long-term challenge of investing in infrastructure, education, health, and other public services to improve the skills and economic opportunities of growing numbers of young people, diminishing the political threats that rising Islamist movements in both Sunni and Shia countries engender. As long as oil prices remain at current levels, the budgets of the region's energy-exporting economies will allow this crucial structural transformation and modernization of these economies while containing risks of social and political unrest. These structural reforms need to be accelerated. In countries like Saudi Arabia, a lost generation of youth raised on Islamic education alone lacks the skills to be productive in a modern economy.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group. Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of RGE Monitor.

I've been comparing notes with my colleague and close friend Nouriel Roubini on political and economic expectations for a few key regions in the year ahead -- a back and forth that's resulting in a global forecast for 2010. 

Today, we begin with Latin America.

Ian Bremmer: I do think we can expect a solid recovery in Latin America in 2010, as most governments in the region profited from sharply improved macroeconomic fundamentals to survive the slowdown with minimal damage. But a busy electoral calendar over the next two years, highlighted by Brazil's presidential election in October, will tempt policymakers to inflate their political popularity via heavy state spending. Governments like those in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Peru will benefit from the sound macroeconomic policies of recent years. Political officials in places like Argentina, Venezuela, and Ecuador may find their popularity built atop shifting sands. The Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner government in Argentina, faced with rising inflation and an increasingly hostile congress, will prove especially vulnerable.

The really interesting story this year is in Brazil, where oil wealth and President Lula's popularity have seduced the government into less disciplined macroeconomic policy and a more statist approach to foreign investment and strategic economic sectors. Lula's preferred presidential successor, Dilma Rousseff, should be considered a slight favorite to win. If she does, she'll deepen state involvement in Brazil's economy. If opposition candidate Jose Serra wins, we'll see less bias toward state-owned enterprises and tighter fiscal policy. Whoever wins, there is one obvious wide-open sector for foreign investment: transport infrastructure. There's a lot of work to do to prepare Rio for the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016.

Nouriel Roubini: Latin America is divided between economies that follow market-oriented policies (while attentive to social issues) such as Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, and more populist governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, and Ecuador. The latter group maintained its political popularity and solid economic performance given that commodity prices recovered, but some of these regimes are fragile and weakening. Venezuela's recent devaluation is a signal of a seriously mismanaged economy; in Argentina, the popularity of the Kirchner duo is faltering and the next president -- whoever he may be -- is expected to be more moderate and market friendly; Ecuador's Correa populism is kept in check by the popularity of dollarization.

Even in market-oriented economies, important structural reform challenges remain. In Brazil, Lula maintained macro stability (sound fiscal policy and independent central bank but with some recent slippages in fiscal discipline), but he failed in implementing structural and micro reforms that would accelerate the potential growth of Brazil. Implementation of those reforms will depend on whether Jose Serra or Dilma Rousseff is elected president. In Chile, Pinera will have to work hard to ensure that more aggressive market-oriented reforms don't lead to a return to greater income and wealth inequality.

Throughout Latin America, democratic transitions require that presidents (i.e., Uribe, Lula, Correa, and Chavez) avoid tinkering with constitutions and electoral laws to seek endless terms in power. Otherwise, the nefarious regional tradition of strongmen and caudillos will return. Alternation of power is necessary to strengthen democratic institutions.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group. Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of RGE Monitor.

Wrapping up another year's Davos. As always, far too much to do and think about. But a big parting thought from the snowy mountains is how the world economic forum squares the notion that much of the world is no longer as with them on globalization. Three broad directions they can take, however proactively:

1) Change the mandate. Davos may be in Switzerland, but make it assertively not about the west or the developed world's values for running of the global economy. Instead, it becomes a value-neutral debating ground for the world's economic powers to hash out their (growing) disagreements. In short, the G20 with both public and private sector.

2) Change the attendance. Recognize the differences, continue to promote an assertively pro-market agenda, and accept that those that oppose it will increasingly not show up.

3) Shoot the middle...and lose the spirit. All but the strongest globalization advocates and detractors attend, the agenda continues largely as it was, but with public debates becomîng more intractable and fewer "Davos moments." 

Surely the latter is the most likely, at least for now. Not least because just as davos comes in January, the summer Davos has now settled to China each year. Maybe the half solution is for the best. But it will be a shame to see the "spirit of davos" ebb away. Last year's meeting had the delegates atwitter when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan stormed off the stage after a heated debate with Israel's Shimon Peres...not in keeping with the spirit of Davos. And no Erdogan to be seen this year. I suspect that's to become more the norm.

Ian Bremmer blogged from Davos throughout the conference, sending reports and commentary from inside the World Economic Forum.

Despite all the Davos focus on climate change and alternative energy, I've heard surprisingly little on 2 key issues. One: shale gas, which most of my friends in the industry think is a game changer. In part, I suspect it's because it's technical, and there are far more business folk and ngos on these panels than specialists. But could also be because new shale gas champion exxon mobil didn't field a team for Davos. Apparently, CEO Rex Tillerson's participation was contingent on a high level public bilateral, but the other person in question didn't show. My educated guess says Brazilian President Lula, where energy reform means international exploration is in the balance.

Two: Geoengineering. The greater the inevitability of severe climate change, the more obvious it is that we'll see a proliferation of interventionist measures. It's probably one of the biggest new greenfield research and development prospects in the world today. And yet there we've heard almost nothing of it at davos. Could be it's just this side of out of consensus. Or maybe it's still too science fiction for the over-50 set (I'd say the over-40 set, but that now includes me.  criminy)

Ian Bremmer will be blogging from Davos this week sending reports and commentary from inside the World Economic Forum.

Just completed a panel on "weak signals" ... essentially, factors generally underappreciated (or, in market parlance, not priced in) with significant global implications for the future. A very wide ranging discussion. And notably, almost all the signals offered for discussion by the group were negative.

There was geopolitics -- China's peaceful rise becomes prickly. There was finance -- interconnectedness creates ever more rapid cycles of ever more severe crises. There was society -- fragmentation of personal and community relationships strengthens broader, more authoritarian types of affiliation. There was business -- information overload means impressionistic psychological values of business increasingly trumps fiscal realities. And many, many more.

To be fair, there were two notable exceptions -- social impact of the dramatic change in global role of women. And backlash against personal overstretch in work-life balance (though maybe that last one is wishful thinking).

But still, why so glum? A few plausible answers. All 4 probably contributed.

1) My buddy Nouriel Roubini (Dr. Doom) was a fellow panelist.

2) Can't make an omelette without breaking eggs, and since the eggs get broken first, that's what we're focusing on.  

3) Davos tends to represent the establishment and its members don't tend to benefit from change. Or ... we've seen the problem, and it is us.

4) Rapid geoeconomic and geopolitical change leads to a world increasingly lacking leadership.  weak signals are becoming more problematic accordingly. Or, to be more bleak, we're actually in a pre-war, not a post-war environment, and we're assessing coming changes accordingly.

Ian Bremmer will be blogging from Davos this week sending reports and commentary from inside the World Economic Forum.

Some follow up on Obama team representation -- the White House directly signed off on every American official to attend the World Economic Forum meetings (not the way it's been historically, apparently). The Obama reaction to press attention in Copenhagen from a large U.S. delegation was negative, just didn't want large numbers of american officials seen cavorting in the swiss alps on the taxpayer dime. Instead, Sarkozy gets to dominate the meeting (still, by far the most important of the speeches).

Speaking of Copenhagen, I spent some time last night with Copenhagen host Connie Hedegaard -- softer and more charming one on one than when she's at the rostrum. Who was clearly disappointed and frustrated from the public coordination/commitment on the environment here at the davos programme. As for Copenhagen, she's convinced that there was (and is) strong disagreement within the Beijing government on how to work with the international community, and that was a big part of the breakdown from the summit. On the former, maybe (heck, probably, it's a big country). But on the latter, I doubt it. If there's one thing chinese delegations do well, it's get their speaking points in order before they put foot to ground. I've experienced that first hand with every comment anyone in the delegation has made to me on currency over the last four days. I can't imagine with the searing public spectacle of the Copenhagen summit it was going to be any different.

Ian Bremmer will be blogging from Davos this week sending reports and commentary from inside the World Economic Forum.