By Jennifer Lee

The new, young regime in North Korea surprised more than a few observers when it agreed last week to a moratorium on its nuclear activities in return for 240,000 tons of U.S. food aid so soon after Kim Jong Un assumed leadership. Instead of the legitimacy-building provocations expected from the young Kim (who is in his late 20s), the world got a measured concession from a totalitarian regime that demonstrated a degree of consensus and decision-making ability. In some ways, it was the story of the young son continuing his father Kim Jong Il's efforts to improve relations with the U.S. prior to his death.

There is general optimism surrounding the agreement, which stalls North Korea's uranium enrichment program, and nuclear and long-range missile tests, and allows the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Last week's step forward, however, does not necessarily presage a more substantive shift in North Korea's posture. The agreement allows North Korea to possibly address its immediate concerns (economic sanctions) and affect domestic politics in South Korea, without ceding its ability to provoke or flip the switch (again) on its nuclear program.

While it is easy to think that the U.S. food aid "carrot" must have been the main reason behind North Korea agreeing to this deal, it is unlikely the case. North Korea is not known for being particularly concerned about the hunger of its people (allegedly more than one million people died during the famine in the 90s, and food security has been dismal for the past few decades); and the totalitarian nature of the regime means that its leaders are not very concerned about their approval ratings.

North Korea is more concerned about the economic condition of the state and the long-term implications of sanctions (North Korea's version of the statement mentions that it would want to discuss the lifting of sanctions and provision of light water reactors if the Six Party Talks resume). The current move is probably a gambit to see if it can resume the Six Party Talks and have sanctions lifted without giving up the nuclear program. The deal is also likely an effort by Pyongyang to slight the Lee Myung-bak administration in Seoul, which it views with hostility, in the hope of increasing the chances of the liberal parties in South Korea's presidential election in December.

The U.S. and South Korea both have presidential elections this year. The agreement is likely North Korea's way of buying time for a year or so until the South Korean administration changes, while trying to extract concessions from an Obama administration that does not want any more conflicts on its hands during an election year. This is also a moratorium that is to last only while "productive dialogue continues." Everything North Korea has promised is reversible if it decides to back out. And it certainly has set a precedent for doing so. Furthermore, this moratorium applies only to the Yongbyun nuclear facilities; it is widely believed that there are several other nuclear development sites throughout North Korea that will be out of reach under this agreement.

It should not be forgotten that North Korea's nuclear capability has been extolled within North Korea as Kim Jong Il's most important legacy. It is undoubtedly seen as the single most powerful card that North Korea has, and with the recent leadership transition to a young new leader, there is little chance that the country will completely forgo this leverage, especially after the NATO operation in Libya that removed Muammar Qaddafi.

There is still a possibility that this could turn into something positive and lasting for U/S.-North Korea relations or North Korea's future behavior. Last week's agreement demonstrates that the totalitarian regime in North Korea was able to take a rational step for its self-interest. But it does not demonstrate that North Korea is contemplating giving up its nuclear weapons, or that it is on the verge of changing its behavior.

Jennifer Lee is an associate in Eurasia Group's Asia practice.

By Heather Berkman and Sean West  

U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk told the House Ways and Means Committee on Feb. 9 that the Obama administration is serious about progress on the South Korea, Panama, and Colombia free trade agreements. He wouldn't commit to a timeline, but we think Congress will pass all three deals this year -- though not without a round of serious political deal making.

Obama campaigned on the need to extract additional concessions from South Korea, Colombia and Panama before any of these deals, all of which were negotiated and signed by President George W. Bush, deserved ratification. For example, automakers and the United Auto Workers complained that the South Korea deal opened the U.S. auto market to Korean imports without securing reciprocal liberalization.

The United States took two years to tell South Korea exactly what it wanted changed, but the two sides have finally negotiated a side deal in which the Koreans made additional concessions. With the new agreement providing political cover, Obama now officially endorses the deal and will send it to Capitol Hill for ratification soon.

The path forward for the Panama and Colombia FTAs is a bit murkier. The Panama deal -- which, frankly, will have negligible economic impact on either country -- was first held up because Pedro Miguel Gonzalez, who later became leader of the Panamanian National Assembly, was indicted by a U.S. grand jury on charges he shot and killed a U.S. serviceman in 1992. When Gonzalez left government in 2009, U.S. trade skeptics shifted their criticism to Panama's alleged role as a tax haven, forcing the Ricardo Martinelli administration to reluctantly sign a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the Treasury Department.   

The Colombia deal faces a more difficult battle. U.S. labor unions loudly oppose the pact because so many Colombian trade unionists and labor leaders have been murdered by paramilitary organizations. The number of murders has fallen in recent years, and though Colombia probably still has the highest murder rate of union members in the western hemisphere, it probably also has the highest rate of murders of priests, schoolchildren, and bus drivers. In short, despite significant government progress in cracking down on armed groups and reducing the homicide rate, Colombia remains an intensely violent place -- for labor leaders and many others. There's no way to solve that problem in the context of a trade negotiation.

By pushing these trade deals forward, the Obama administration is making a political bet. The White House knows the left has a long list of gripes with the president, and that pushing hard on trade deals will add fuel to the fire. But presidents benefit from the economic boosts provided by trade -- and Obama views the deals as a way to reach out to the independent and moderate voters he'll need in 2012.

Aware that Washington can't expect much more from these countries, the Obama administration will court reluctant Democratic lawmakers by extracting relatively minor concessions -- like a pledge from the Panamanian government to ratify a tax treaty or from the Colombian government to put more of those who kill union leaders on trial.

What will Democratic lawmakers want in return? They may well call on the White House to work much harder to enforce existing agreements before moving forward with new ones. That means moving forward with antidumping and countervailing duty cases against China -- both at the World Trade Organization and through domestic remedy. 

With so little expected from a divided Congress, the White House will trumpet these deals as important accomplishments. But it will have been the U.S. political context that changed -- not the content of the deals.

Heather Berkman is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Latin America practice. Sean West is a U.S. political risk analyst with the firm.

Almost as soon as the midterm elections ended, President Barack Obama set off on a 10-day Asia swing. He's found friendly footing abroad so far: a receptive India looking for a general counterweight to China and a rapturous day in Indonesia, where Obama spent several formative years as a child. Next came a G20 summit hosted by South Korea, a strengthening U.S. ally, and then he'll hit Yokohama for an APEC summit and to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance. But this happy-go-lucky itinerary doesn't even hint at an overarching foreign policy. Which got me thinking, is Obama ever going to come up with one?

Plenty of commercial and defense deals were delivered during the India visit, which shows how that relationship is improving. There were high hopes for a breakthrough in Seoul on the U.S.-Korea trade agreement, though that now seems unlikely (at least for now). The Japan visit should include broad agreement on Tokyo moving ahead (along with the United States) with a trans-Pacific partnership (TPP). But these are all small things.

What's the big picture?

I was thinking about this while listening to Undersecretary of State Bob Hormats around-the-world speech at the World Affairs Council in Washington last week. I couldn't help but compare it with a similar speech from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton a couple months before. They both talked about the necessity of focusing on issues of bilateral cooperation with China, on Japan as the lynchpin of U.S. policy in the region, on the necessity of promoting free trade, the determination to stay focused on fighting terrorism, and to continue to support democracies around the world. There was talk about not neglecting traditional U.S. allies in Europe. And then, at the end, both emphasized the need to maintain strong commitments with America's key allies in the Western hemisphere, Canada, and Mexico.

I also thought about a speech I had heard from then Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2005. How different were the speeches? How much had the basic precepts of U.S. foreign policy changed over the course of the last two administrations, and during the past five years? To be charitable, I'd say 2 percent. Maybe. Primarily, the difference is that Asia is now taking up a little more attention, Europe getting slightly shorter shrift. Yet in that same period of time, the world has clearly changed more than 2 percent.

I'd say the world has hit a decisive inflection point, even more profound than after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fall of the wall produced a new global security balance, to be sure -- the United States emerged as the sole hegemon. But in terms of the global economic and policy order, the world basically moved from the G7 to the G7+1. And to be blunt, the +1 sped up the process of globalization, but it did not reflect a new world order. Once the financial crisis hit, by contrast, the G7+1 became the G20. And that, however unworkable, is indeed a completely new ordering principle. It means different types of countries and governments vying for influence, power, and preference on key issues of global governance-from trade to currency to the politics of austerity, on climate, and on conventional and cyber security.

Yet there's a stark disconnect between our drastically changed world and US foreign policymaking. Over the past few decades, foreign policy has been the preserve of presidents, successful or not (think about the Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and Bush "doctrines"). But two years and a Nobel Peace Prize into the Obama administration, there's no sign of an Obama doctrine. This U.S. president has handled foreign policy primarily by managing conflict as it arises (stepping in directly when absolutely required), and otherwise making small, incremental policy gains on fronts with momentum. Obama has shaped America's foreign policy apparatus accordingly, with a strong and relatively autonomous Secretary of State in Clinton, a series of senior, competent special envoys in the State Department to handle intractable, longstanding foreign concerns, and loyal but comparatively weak, non-strategic national security advisers (namely, Jim Jones and now Tom Donilon, who primarily serve to coordinate policy communication and untangle disputes, not to leverage the National Security Council as a mechanism for executive policymaking.

The biggest new idea that the Obama White House flirted with, albeit briefly, was the prospect of a G2 -- a notion that the new world order could be jointly managed by the United States and China. But that concept was essentially stillborn as the first efforts to realize it came to an embarrassing naught at the Copenhagen climate summit last December. Since then, U.S-.China relations have steadily deteriorated on most fronts. For the world at large, that means a growing disconnect on global architecture -- think Gondwanaland, inexorably splitting into continents while the old government still embraces a single state. But faster. 

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? 

For the sixth time in less than four years, the U.N. Security Council has voted to impose new sanctions on Iran in connection with its nuclear program. Nothing new there. U.S. officials wanted stronger measures, but the Chinese in particular pushed back hard. Nothing new there either. The sanctions, which are still significantly tougher than earlier models and include tightened restrictions on arms sales, new headaches for Iranian shipping, and an assault on the finances of the Revolutionary Guard and about 40 Iranian companies, will not persuade Iran's government to renounce its nuclear ambitions. Nor is there anything new there.

The real news is that Turkey and Brazil voted no. That's a diplomatic coup for Tehran, which in five previous UNSC votes had won virtually no support. Qatar voted no on the first round of sanctions in July 2006. Indonesia abstained on the fourth round in March 2008. Support from regional heavyweights like Turkey and Brazil (and an abstention from Lebanon) give Iran something tangible to build on as its embattled government works to ease its isolation and to persuade other governments to resist U.S. and European calls for further sanctions outside the U.N. process.

President Ahmadinejad's recent dance card-a Russia/Turkey summit on security just before the sanctions vote and a trip to Beijing just after-illustrates the value of that strategy.

But there's a larger point here about the current state of international politics. It's getting harder for Washington to exercise international leadership. With 10 percent unemployment, an ambitious legislative agenda, an oil spill, and mid-term elections to worry about, President Obama has limited time and energy to invest in grand strategy on foreign policy. Managing geopolitical risk has also become much more complicated in a world that has shifted from a G7 model of international leadership to a G20 model that brings countries like Brazil and Turkey to the international bargaining table. And there is no emerging power willing and able to fill the gap left by new limits on American power and resources, because European powers, China, Russia and others who might lead on key transnational issues are likewise occupied with complex challenges at home.

In other words, no one is really steering this ship, and we can't expect it to sail smoothly through troubled waters.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?

There's a lot of buzz about French President Sarkozy's speech last night, more than Obama's state of the union address. In part because we were sleeping, and in part because while Obama gives a better speech, Sarkozy is a more effective populist. 

It's no particular trick to go after the bankers; it's almost sport this year, but folks don't really have their heart in it.

Not so the French president. He went after the bankers, the dollar, capitalism with righteous indignation. Obama goes through the motions, but he's still all about hope and the vision thing (after all, he may need to tack back in a few months). Sarkozy wants to channel all these angry people.

To be fair, Davos folks aren't all that angry. Something like two people applauded when Sarkozy said the world had to put morality back into capitalism. There were all sorts of reasons for that (lack of) reaction -- antipathy, profound skepticism, malaise, jetlag. But it wasn't a message that was going to rile the Davos folks. Having said that, unless you're Klaus Schwab (or, nowadays, Bill Clinton), most of these speeches are for the home team.

* * *

Just overhead the Davos quote of the hour. South African President Jacob Zuma: "We must respect the culture of others. Polygamy is my culture and i treat my wives completely equal." Call it a wives' tale. Incidentally, there's a very large South African delegation accompanying the South African president, but I've only seen men. 

Ian Bremmer will be blogging from Davos this week sending reports and commentary from inside the World Economic Forum. 

By Ian Bremmer and David Gordon

South Asia is still a morass in 2010, but the U.S. troop surge has given Obama some time. Afghanistan will produce bigger and bigger domestic headlines, but not much will actually change until the United States reaches (or, more likely, is forced to reach) a decision point. For now, that's 2011 at the earliest.

Having said that, there's a broader South Asia risk developing this year. The decision by Pakistan to go after terrorists domestically provides Islamic extremists with powerful reasons to expand asymmetric attacks on Pakistan's urban centers and to try to reignite Indian-Pakistani conflict. That's easy enough to do. Pakistan's extremist groups have increased in sophistication and consolidated their capacity, both by joining together and by forging closer links to al Qaeda in the region. In Pakistan, a significant proportion of the population continues to believe that terrorist attacks against the population originate in India. Pakistani networks operating in India haven't gotten much attention, however, and represent a weak link on the counterterrorist front.

This means that the likelihood of attacks in India and against Indian targets in the region is increasing, a particular worry given the nature of the potential targets (government facilities and densely populated urban areas). The Indian government is aware of the threat and has sought to improve its counterterrorist response -- including via increased ground-level coordination in Delhi and Mumbai with American and British counterterrorist organizations. But progress has been slow, and India's counterterrorism capacity remains underdeveloped, badly coordinated, and vulnerable.

Meanwhile, any new attacks would put serious pressure on India to take a tougher line on Pakistan. India's Congress Party leadership is loath to escalate military tensions with Pakistan. But following a quieter line after the Mumbai attacks in late 2008, it made strong demands on Pakistan to take decisive steps against extremist networks with ties to India. Successful large-scale attacks would undermine the Congress Party's credibility on the issue, leading the Indian government to take outsized steps in raising the military posture toward Pakistan. That, in turn, means Pakistan shifting its focus away from the tribal areas and, as importantly, changing its strategic view on taking on further operations -- a shift that would sit comfortably with much of Pakistan's senior military command, who still see rising India as Pakistan's main strategic challenge.

Indian-Pakistani relations, which had been quietly improving during the final years of the Musharraf regime, have already deteriorated somewhat under President Asif Ali Zardari, and it will prove harder for both sides to back away from any high-level military alert. Meanwhile, in both Delhi and Islamabad, Obama's pledge during his Afghan speech to begin U.S. troop withdrawals in 2011 is being read as a signal that the United States is minimizing its long-term commitment to the region. This feeds the already powerful views in both capitals that they should plan for continuation of their long-term strategic rivalry. Worst case, should there be a series of terror attacks in India, we could see Indian efforts to secure international sanctions against Pakistan -- and potentially surgical strikes by India against military training camps inside Pakistan. In short, for the first time in nearly a decade, there are serious factors pushing the Indian and Pakistani governments back toward confrontation.

Next stop: Eastern Europe.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, and David Gordon is the firm's head of research.

By Ian Bremmer and David Gordon

By far the biggest purely geopolitical risk in 2010 comes from Iran. Its government now faces growing pressure on three fronts. At home, the regime has had a tough time since last June's presidential election; hardliners had initially consolidated, but are now under intensifying pressure as domestic protests continue. Regionally, Tehran has lost considerable influence, with elections in Lebanon turning against Hizbullah, rising Iraqi nationalism making it harder for Tehran to exert influence upon their principal historic competitors, and Iran's financial outpost in Dubai put at risk by the growing influence of Abu Dhabi.

Globally, Iran faces a considerably tougher sanctions regime over its nuclear program, a push spearheaded by the United States, Europe, and Japan, with even Russia and China unhappy over Tehran's aggressive rhetoric. A Western push for negotiations will continue, but divisive local politics and insufficient leadership coordination make it very unlikely that Iran's leadership could reach a negotiated settlement even if it wanted one. And it doesn't. Even under considerable domestic pressure, the hardliners in charge of the regime will continue to try to buy time to achieve their nuclear ambitions.

That's why the government is likely to overreact to sanctions when they hit. 2010 carries the highest risk to date of Iranian provocation in the region, in the form of harassment of shipping in and around the Strait of Hormuz, support for radical organizations in neighboring countries, and instigation of trouble for Iraq and other neighbors in demonstrations of muscle. The Iranian regime looks increasingly like a cornered, wounded animal. In 2010, it's likely to act like one.

Israeli military strikes have actually become less likely -- certainly for the first half of the year as sanctions are put in place. Faced with strong opposition from the Obama administration (even as it uses the threat of strikes to gain support for sanctions and to pressure Tehran), mounting intelligence challenges on the location of key Iranian targets, and recognition of the military limitations of Israeli strikes, some Israeli government officials now privately are beginning to discuss how to cope with an eventual nuclear Iran as much as the nature of its "existential threat." Still, the perceived Israeli national security issue is enormous. Looking toward the final months of the year, the Israelis remain an important question mark.

Over time, if the regime in Tehran remains in power, the Iran danger will become more diffuse and start to look more like North Korea. It's clearly a significant long-term negative for global stability. Though for Iran itself, by 2011, we'll probably see a bunch of countries start thinking about how they'd like to start investing there, even as the Western powers seek to prolong sanctions.

Next up: Fiscal issues in Europe

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, and David Gordon's is the firm's head of research.

By Ian Bremmer

President Obama embarks today on a tour of East Asia, a region central to U.S. geopolitical interests and its economic recovery. The primary goal is "strategic reassurance," a term Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg has used to describe U.S. relations with China.

On Friday, he'll reassure Japan's brand new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama that, despite well-publicized recent frictions in U.S.-Japanese relations and a broader U.S. engagement with China, his administration considers ties with Japan a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. And he'll seek some reassurance that the new DPJ government isn't about to revisit key assumptions in the relationship. Hatoyama will likely take the opportunity to "clarify" his view on the importance of the security partnership. Throw in a highly publicized Obama speech on Saturday, and we can expect an easing of suspicion and a lot of warm smiles, especially since the two sides now appear to have a deal on a joint-commission to resolve the Okinawa troops and base relocation issues.

On Sunday, Obama will be in Singapore, where he'll reassure Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong that the US isn't planning on reducing its Asian presence anytime soon. He'll then join the festivities at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. During the meetings, there will be early discussion of an "Asian Economic Community" and rumors that Obama is involved in discussion with ASEAN leaders on a U.S.-ASEAN free trade agreement -- though he'll more likely simply be offering reassurance that his government hasn't set its trade agenda on indefinite hold. The meeting will end with public pledges from all sides to reject protectionism, the sort of empty reassurances we've seen in recent months at G20 meetings in Washington and London. Much of the media focus will be on the silk shirts and blouses inspired by Singapore's Peranakan culture that the leaders will be wearing.

More interesting are the side meetings that we'll hear much less about. Obama is scheduled to sit down with Myanmar's prime minister to reassure him that the United States is willing to engage the country's military junta if there's any prospect that engagement might yield results. Back home, Obama will reassure critics in Washington that he won't move to lift sanctions until Myanmar's generals offer something of substance. He's also scheduled to meet with Indonesian President Yudhoyono to assure him that the U.S. views the emerging regional player as a valuable local partner, and with Russia's President Medvedev to assure him that his administration is serious about improving strained relations with Moscow.

On Monday, Obama heads for Shanghai and Beijing for a three-day visit that includes some sightseeing and a Q&A with Chinese students around meetings with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The talking points for these sessions are nearly as ambitious as what you'd expect from one of those G20 meetings. There will be discussion of the recently contentious U.S.-Chinese trade relationship, energy, human rights, stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran. Obama can reassure China's leaders that he seeks mutually profitable engagement with the one subject he's NOT likely to bring up: The value of China's currency. The Chinese wouldn't welcome the discussion, and Obama has no interest in inviting the Chinese to comment on the state of the U.S. economy and Washington's role in it.

If there's any tangible progress from Obama's time in China, it will be on climate change/green energy issues. There may well be an agreement to expand joint development and investment in renewable energy technology. It won't be a true "breakthrough," but given the low likelihood that anything especially important comes out of climate change meetings in Copenhagen next month, the Obama team will use any sign of modest progress to reassure skeptics of his commitment on the issue and to tout the trip as a success.

On the way home, Obama will stop off in Seoul to tell South Korean President Lee Myung-bak that KORUS, the U.S.-South Korean free trade agreement, isn't dead. He'll also reassure Lee that, though the US won't reduce troop levels on the peninsula, Washington can help make their stay a little easier for South Korea's government to manage.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group.

JACQUES WITT/AFP/Getty Images

By Willis Sparks and Geoff Porter

As the world focuses on the diplomatic tug of war over Iran's nuclear program, Israel lives with the worrying hum of all those centrifuges spinning just a thousand miles to the east. Yet, Benjamin Netanyahu's government knows that if Israel launches airstrikes, there's a limit to how much damage can be done and how long Iran's progress can be delayed. It therefore has to persuade the Obama administration -- and anyone else who might help slow Iran's march -- to see the risks from Iran as Israel sees them.

It helped that Iran recently revealed the existence of an undeclared nuclear site near the city of Qom. At the very least, that revelation of Iranian dishonesty might have made it a little more difficult for Beijing and Moscow to justify continued resistance to sanctions. Yet, Israel remained quiet. Suddenly it appeared Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and National Security Advisor Uzi Arad might have a wind at their backs. Though they'd like the wind to blow a bit more steadily and to get them to their destination quicker, they can't risk the rhetoric that might label them as blowhards.

But now there's talk of a diplomatic breakthrough. Following talks in Geneva with negotiators from the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany, Iran has signed on to a tentative "interim agreement" to accept a U.S.-Russian proposal (that has been on the table for more than a year) to ship much of its low enriched uranium outside the country for reprocessing. Ensuring that this uranium is processed outside the country would help verify that it's used for civilian, not military, purposes. And then over the weekend, Iran ostensibly agreed to allow IAEA inspectors into the Qom facility on Oct. 25.

This leaves the Israeli government in a bind. First, because the details have yet to be worked out and Iran could renounce a completed agreement at any time, Israel can't take much comfort from it. Second, the fact that others treat it as a potential diplomatic breakthrough makes it even less likely than before that Israel could justify military strikes or that the US can persuade Russia and (especially) China to support sanctions tough enough to make any difference in Iran's strategic planning.

Israel has no faith that the potential for diplomatic détente between Iran and the US and EU is anything more than an Iranian stalling tactic, buying Tehran more time to speed toward the nuclear finish line. Likewise, Israel doesn't believe that sanctions -- no matter how tough they are -- will back Iran down. For Israel, diplomacy and sanctions are merely different forms of delay, but Netanyahu has little choice but to wait them out.

He'll be waiting for some time. First, diplomacy has to run its course. Following the tentative agreement in Geneva and the announcement that Iran will allow inspection of its Qom facility, the diplomatic track seems to be gaining momentum. Once that momentum slows and stalemate resumes, sanctions will be debated and some of them will be implemented. That won't happen before spring 2010 at the earliest.

In the meantime, Israel has little choice but to sit on its hands. Netanyahu knows that strikes on Iran's nuclear sites during delicate negotiations would inflict much more damage to Israel's international reputation -- and its relations with Washington, in particular -- than to Iran's nuclear program. Nothing brings this home more clearly than the U.N. Human Rights Council's report investigating Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip in 2008-09, which came very close to launching a legal process within the UN that could have produced a referral to the U.N. Security Council -- and possibly a war crimes tribunal. That's not going to happen, but it underscored already shifting international attitudes toward Israel.

Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has said 2010 would be the year of sanctions. His government was hoping for a year of action. Instead, Israel will wait.

Willis Sparks is Global Macro Analyst and Geoff Porter is Middle East & Africa Director at Eurasia Group. 

Alex Wong/Getty Images

by Ian Bremmer

In Afghanistan, even the good news isn't so good. The country managed to hold a presidential election in August, but there aren't many people inside or outside the country who considered it free and fair. It looks increasingly like Hamid Karzai will win without a second round, but his legitimacy will remain under a very large, very dark cloud. He'll face open revolt from Tajiks in the north, who overwhelmingly opposed his candidacy. And as evidenced by the significant recent expansion of terrorist bombings in Afghanistan's major cities and the assassination last week of the country's second-ranking intelligence officer, it will even become harder to secure Kabul. No one should have much confidence that a second round would do much to restore Karzai's credibility.

In addition, military operations against the Taliban inside Pakistan achieved some actual success this summer, but that has probably pushed some militants across the border into Afghanistan to harass coalition forces there. U.S. casualties have increased, though that's not surprising given the more aggressive operations of larger numbers of US troops. But last week's U.S. bombing on a Taliban target, which killed dozens of civilians, is just the latest in a series of setbacks for coalition military operations.

More worrisome: It's becoming increasingly clear that Afghanistan won't be able to stand on its own anytime soon. U.S. military officials report that the training of Afghan soldiers is well behind schedule. For the next two or three years, with coalition forces at their present levels, Afghan troops won't be nearly strong enough to maintain even the current level of security, let alone make any meaningful contribution to an aggressive counterinsurgency effort.

Inside Afghanistan, more locals than ever want the US out, whatever the cost. There's also dwindling support for the war in the United States, as the American media increasingly turns its attention from an economy beginning to improve toward the growing death toll in Afghanistan.

Within the Obama foreign-policy team, there looks to be a growing divergence of opinion on what to do next. There appears to be an internal consensus that the current strategy isn't working. But senior officials appear more divided on whether to "go long" or "go home." In the go long group, those who want more troops and more resources because "failure isn't an option," we see Secretary Clinton, envoy Richard Holbrooke, most of the generals on the ground, and most Republicans in Congress. In the go home camp, those who want to pull troops out before things get much worse, are Vice President Biden, most of Obama's political team, and a growing number of senior Democrats. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates appears to have grown much more skeptical.

In short, Afghanistan is becoming Obama's first lasting foreign-policy crisis. A major terrorist attack somewhere in the world carried out by militants trained in Afghanistan could shift international public opinion toward greater engagement. Short of that, U.S. public opposition to the war will likely grow steadily over the coming year, bringing the issue to a head just in time for U.S. midterm elections and driving a wedge between members of the president's own party.

MANPREET ROMANA/AFP/Getty Images

by Ian Bremmer

The growing vulnerabilities of emerging markets to social upheaval and state failure as a result of the financial crisis is probably the most significant risk the world will face this year. That's why last week's G20 decision to significantly expand funding for the International Monetary Fund was so important -- and part of why the meeting itself was successful. This success is especially obvious once we accept the limits of what this forum can really accomplish. An urgent call for help was answered, but there was never any real chance that leaders would use this meeting to remake the international financial and economic order in a way that genuinely reflects the shift of recent years in the global balance of political and economic power.

But the seeds have been planted for longer-term problems. Chinese President Hu Jintao said very little during the event but was given an enormous level of respect by the other G20 participants and the media. This reflects the reality that many are now ready to accept China as a superpower. For the near term, this change will prove useful, because China has the money to help fund existing international financial institutions shepherd vulnerable countries through their domestic economic problems. But longer-term, it may become a problem, because China isn't fully ready to play this role and because China's leaders have fundamental disagreements with the leaders of other powerful states on how the global economic system should be governed. 

Looking ahead, the broader promise of a G20 remaking the international order for long-term sustainability remains unrealistic. Reimagining the architecture of any multinational effort -- not just of financial institutions but of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the composition of the United Nations Security Council, efforts to stop the international flow of illegal drugs, agreement on a single definition of "terrorism," a successor to the Kyoto protocols that will have a meaningful impact on climate change, and other difficult issues. That's just not possible in today's geopolitical environment. 

Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images

By Ian Bremmer

In the Pakistani city of Lahore on Tuesday, a dozen gunmen attacked a bus carrying members of Sri Lanka's cricket team, killing six policemen and a driver and injuring several of the athletes. Press accounts of the assault suggest a level of coordination similar to that used by the Pakistan-based militants who killed 173 people at several sites in Mumbai in September. Across Pakistan, suicide bombers killed two people in 2005, six in 2006, 56 in 2007, and 61 in 2008. Suicide attackers killed more people in Pakistan last year than in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

There are two important reasons why the threat of global terrorism is growing. The first is long-term and structural. The second is more directly tied to the global financial crisis. Both have everything to do with what's happening in Pakistan.

First, a report released in December from the U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism hints at both sets of problems. The report notes an increasing supply of nuclear technology and material around the world and warns that "without greater urgency and decisive action by the world community, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."

Destructive (and potentially destructive) technologies are now more accessible than at any time in history for small groups and even individuals. This will dramatically increase the baseline threat of disruptive violence from non-state actors over time. It's not just biological and nuclear material. GPS tracking devices help pirates operating off Somalia's coast venture further from shore and undertake increasingly ambitious attacks on private and commercial vessels.

Second, it's unlikely that we'll see the "greater urgency and decisive action by the world community" called for in the report. For the moment, political leaders around the world are too busy wrestling with the effects of the global financial crisis on their domestic economies (and their political standing) to coordinate action against such a diffuse threat.

But there's another reason why the financial crisis heightens the risk of global terrorism. Militants thrive in places where no one is fully in charge. The global recession threatens to create more such places.

No matter how cohesive and determined a terrorist organization, it needs a supportive environment in which to flourish. That means a location that provides a steady stream of funds and recruits and the support (or at least acceptance) of the local population. Much of the counter-terrorist success we've seen in Iraq's al Anbar province over the past two years is a direct result of an increased willingness of local Iraqis to help the Iraqi army and US troops oust the militants operating there. In part, that's because the area's tribal leaders have their own incentives (including payment in cash and weaponry) for cooperating with occupation forces. But it's also because foreign militants have alienated the locals.

The security deterioration of the past year in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects exactly the opposite phenomenon. In the region along both sides of their shared border, local tribal leaders have yet to express much interest in helping Pakistani and NATO soldiers target local or foreign militants. For those with the power to either protect or betray the senior al-Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in the region, NATO and Pakistani authorities have yet to find either sweet enough carrots or sharp enough sticks to shift allegiances.  

The slowdown threatens to slow the progress of a number of developing countries. Most states don't provide ground as fertile for militancy as places like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. But as more people lose their jobs, their homes, and opportunities for prosperity -- in emerging market countries or even within minority communities inside developed states -- it becomes easier for local militants to find volunteers. 

This is why the growing risk of attack from suicide bombers and well-trained gunmen in Pakistan creates risks that extend beyond South Asia. This is a country that is home to lawless regions where local and international militants thrive, nuclear weapons and material, a history of nuclear smuggling, a cash-starved government, and a deteriorating economy. Pakistan is far from the only country in which terrorism threatens to spill across borders. But there's a reason why the security threats flowing back and forth across the Afghan-Pakistani border rank so highly on Eurasia Group's list of top political risks for 2009 -- and why they remain near the top of the Obama administration's security agenda.

AAMIR QURESHI/GETTYIMAGES