Obama Administration

By Jun Okumura and Ross Schaap

The conventional wisdom in U.S.-Japanese relations is that things were largely fine until the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) upset the apple cart by winning control of Japan's government. Security policy observers appear to accept the idea that the DPJ has strained the close relationship that Japan's former ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had developed with the United States over the past several decades. A show of bilateral solidarity during President Obama's one-night stand in Tokyo last week has done little to change these opinions. The conventional wisdom has it wrong.

The source of this mistaken belief centers on the DPJ's electoral promise to review the 2006 U.S.-Japanese agreement that would move the bulk of a US Marine base out of the center of Ginowan, a city of nearly 100,000 in Okinawa, to Guam. The remainder -- a large contingency of helicopters-would relocate to a more remote location near Nago, also within Okinawa. The DPJ's indecision on whether to move ahead with construction of a new airfield above a coral reef near Nago seems to have thrown a wrench in the works, but the real difference between the DPJ and the LDP is simply in the visibility of its reluctance to give Washington what it wants.

The disconnect here is in overestimation of cooperation from the LDP. The long history of this redeployment headache gets left out of most accounts of the current controversy. The initial U.S. force redeployment deal was agreed in 1996, and the new airfield and redeployment were supposed to be completed by 2004. Instead, after seven years without progress, both sides went back to the bargaining table, a process that eventually yielded the 2006 agreement. Yet, more than three years of LDP rule later, authorization of construction at the airfield still falls to the new DPJ government. In other words, the LDP agreed to give the United States what it wanted ... and then did virtually nothing to make it happen.

So what has changed? The DPJ, not to mention its coalition partner the Social Democratic Party of Japan, is much more openly antagonistic to the 2006 agreement. The visibility of that reluctance has moved the US to respond publicly on an issue that slid by without action on a much lower profile during the Bush years. Unusually blunt public statements from US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, insisting on quick implementation of the 2006 agreement, generated headlines -- and much chatter on bilateral strains. Though the Obama administration appears to have taken a step back, agreeing to set up a joint working group on the Ginowan issue, it continues to reject the one alternative that the Japanese Foreign Minister has been pursuing on his own -- moving the Marine helicopters to Kadena Air Base, an idea which the locals also reject.

That the United States started from a position of intransigence on renegotiation isn't remarkable. But this doesn't mean that's where the issue will end. The U.S. side has waited 13 years; it has no practical reasons to reject a technically and politically viable alternative even if it means a few more years of delay. In fact, further delay is the next likely course of action/inaction. The two sides have been stuck on the status quo conundrum for 13 years for reasons we can only guess at, but likely include operational requirements that leave little or no room for a non-Okinawa solution, while no other viable Okinawa alternative is in sight.

That said, the DPJ's political links to the anti-U.S. military presence in Okinawa, the SDP presence in the coalition, and the unfortunate political calendar, including a mayoral election in January in Nago and an Upper House election in the summer of 2010, are making it exceedingly difficult for the DPJ leadership to make up its mind to accept the lesser evil and give the go-ahead to construction work at Nago.

All this dictates the continuation of the status quo. But then, such a turn of events -- or the lack of one -- should not come as a surprise. In reality, history shows that for U.S.-Japanese relations, there's much less difference between the DPJ and LDP than meets the eye -- in principle or in practice.

Jun Okumura is a senior adviser to Eurasia Group and Ross Schaap is Director of Comparative Analytics.

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By Ian Bremmer

President Obama embarks today on a tour of East Asia, a region central to U.S. geopolitical interests and its economic recovery. The primary goal is "strategic reassurance," a term Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg has used to describe U.S. relations with China.

On Friday, he'll reassure Japan's brand new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama that, despite well-publicized recent frictions in U.S.-Japanese relations and a broader U.S. engagement with China, his administration considers ties with Japan a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. And he'll seek some reassurance that the new DPJ government isn't about to revisit key assumptions in the relationship. Hatoyama will likely take the opportunity to "clarify" his view on the importance of the security partnership. Throw in a highly publicized Obama speech on Saturday, and we can expect an easing of suspicion and a lot of warm smiles, especially since the two sides now appear to have a deal on a joint-commission to resolve the Okinawa troops and base relocation issues.

On Sunday, Obama will be in Singapore, where he'll reassure Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong that the US isn't planning on reducing its Asian presence anytime soon. He'll then join the festivities at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. During the meetings, there will be early discussion of an "Asian Economic Community" and rumors that Obama is involved in discussion with ASEAN leaders on a U.S.-ASEAN free trade agreement -- though he'll more likely simply be offering reassurance that his government hasn't set its trade agenda on indefinite hold. The meeting will end with public pledges from all sides to reject protectionism, the sort of empty reassurances we've seen in recent months at G20 meetings in Washington and London. Much of the media focus will be on the silk shirts and blouses inspired by Singapore's Peranakan culture that the leaders will be wearing.

More interesting are the side meetings that we'll hear much less about. Obama is scheduled to sit down with Myanmar's prime minister to reassure him that the United States is willing to engage the country's military junta if there's any prospect that engagement might yield results. Back home, Obama will reassure critics in Washington that he won't move to lift sanctions until Myanmar's generals offer something of substance. He's also scheduled to meet with Indonesian President Yudhoyono to assure him that the U.S. views the emerging regional player as a valuable local partner, and with Russia's President Medvedev to assure him that his administration is serious about improving strained relations with Moscow.

On Monday, Obama heads for Shanghai and Beijing for a three-day visit that includes some sightseeing and a Q&A with Chinese students around meetings with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The talking points for these sessions are nearly as ambitious as what you'd expect from one of those G20 meetings. There will be discussion of the recently contentious U.S.-Chinese trade relationship, energy, human rights, stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran. Obama can reassure China's leaders that he seeks mutually profitable engagement with the one subject he's NOT likely to bring up: The value of China's currency. The Chinese wouldn't welcome the discussion, and Obama has no interest in inviting the Chinese to comment on the state of the U.S. economy and Washington's role in it.

If there's any tangible progress from Obama's time in China, it will be on climate change/green energy issues. There may well be an agreement to expand joint development and investment in renewable energy technology. It won't be a true "breakthrough," but given the low likelihood that anything especially important comes out of climate change meetings in Copenhagen next month, the Obama team will use any sign of modest progress to reassure skeptics of his commitment on the issue and to tout the trip as a success.

On the way home, Obama will stop off in Seoul to tell South Korean President Lee Myung-bak that KORUS, the U.S.-South Korean free trade agreement, isn't dead. He'll also reassure Lee that, though the US won't reduce troop levels on the peninsula, Washington can help make their stay a little easier for South Korea's government to manage.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group.

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By Ian Bremmer

Last week was perhaps the most surreal one of Barack Obama's presidency so far. In the midst of a massive internal debate about what to do with a failing war in Afghanistan, he won the Nobel Peace Prize -- a mixed blessing for several reasons.

Domestically, the Nobel creates a problem because it focuses political attention on foreign policy, which is not Obama's strength. To date, the U.S. president hasn't secured any meaningful foreign policy accomplishments. More importantly, foreign policy isn't the part of his presidency that Obama wants to prioritize. Of course, the prize won't damage Obama's approval ratings at home. His initial response to winning the Nobel was suitably modest and low key, and he'll surely dominate airwaves with a rousing speech when he makes his formal acceptance. However broad the criticism, it's hard to blame the president for the fact that the Norwegians apparently really like him. The challenge will arise in December when Obama flies to Oslo. He'll have to talk up his foreign policy agenda, taking critical headline space away from healthcare reform and the U.S. economy.

Internationally, the prize is a bigger boon for the U.S. president. It burnishes Obama's multilateralism, and shines a light on the enthusiasm about his presidency that's been evinced in much of the world -- particularly compared to his predecessor. Most of the constraints on Obama's foreign policy are structural, given the international indifference to global leadership in general. But at the margins, playing to more ebullient crowds around the world should give Obama a bit more policy flexibility with international interlocutors.

To date, Obama's foreign policy has been largely reactive. He hasn't had the time or the inclination to lay out a sweeping worldview -- a more ideological and strategic approach to foreign policy that would be clearly identified as his own. Instead, his administration's foreign policy has been marked by professionalization, with most of the policy formation done at the bureaucratic level. The Nobel acceptance speech calls for more than that, and it's conceivable that we'll see the outlines of an Obama doctrine in it. It's hard to know what gets top priority in such a speech, but clearly democratic values would play a greater role, which so far we've only seen in non-priority areas (such as in Obama's trip to Ghana, which snubbed Nigeria). But if that's true, it could create conflict. A U.S. grand strategy driven by values is less likely to prove as compatible with the "pragmatic growth" approach of Beijing or authoritarian Western allies in the Middle East.

Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group.

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By Willis Sparks and Geoff Porter

As the world focuses on the diplomatic tug of war over Iran's nuclear program, Israel lives with the worrying hum of all those centrifuges spinning just a thousand miles to the east. Yet, Benjamin Netanyahu's government knows that if Israel launches airstrikes, there's a limit to how much damage can be done and how long Iran's progress can be delayed. It therefore has to persuade the Obama administration -- and anyone else who might help slow Iran's march -- to see the risks from Iran as Israel sees them.

It helped that Iran recently revealed the existence of an undeclared nuclear site near the city of Qom. At the very least, that revelation of Iranian dishonesty might have made it a little more difficult for Beijing and Moscow to justify continued resistance to sanctions. Yet, Israel remained quiet. Suddenly it appeared Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and National Security Advisor Uzi Arad might have a wind at their backs. Though they'd like the wind to blow a bit more steadily and to get them to their destination quicker, they can't risk the rhetoric that might label them as blowhards.

But now there's talk of a diplomatic breakthrough. Following talks in Geneva with negotiators from the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany, Iran has signed on to a tentative "interim agreement" to accept a U.S.-Russian proposal (that has been on the table for more than a year) to ship much of its low enriched uranium outside the country for reprocessing. Ensuring that this uranium is processed outside the country would help verify that it's used for civilian, not military, purposes. And then over the weekend, Iran ostensibly agreed to allow IAEA inspectors into the Qom facility on Oct. 25.

This leaves the Israeli government in a bind. First, because the details have yet to be worked out and Iran could renounce a completed agreement at any time, Israel can't take much comfort from it. Second, the fact that others treat it as a potential diplomatic breakthrough makes it even less likely than before that Israel could justify military strikes or that the US can persuade Russia and (especially) China to support sanctions tough enough to make any difference in Iran's strategic planning.

Israel has no faith that the potential for diplomatic détente between Iran and the US and EU is anything more than an Iranian stalling tactic, buying Tehran more time to speed toward the nuclear finish line. Likewise, Israel doesn't believe that sanctions -- no matter how tough they are -- will back Iran down. For Israel, diplomacy and sanctions are merely different forms of delay, but Netanyahu has little choice but to wait them out.

He'll be waiting for some time. First, diplomacy has to run its course. Following the tentative agreement in Geneva and the announcement that Iran will allow inspection of its Qom facility, the diplomatic track seems to be gaining momentum. Once that momentum slows and stalemate resumes, sanctions will be debated and some of them will be implemented. That won't happen before spring 2010 at the earliest.

In the meantime, Israel has little choice but to sit on its hands. Netanyahu knows that strikes on Iran's nuclear sites during delicate negotiations would inflict much more damage to Israel's international reputation -- and its relations with Washington, in particular -- than to Iran's nuclear program. Nothing brings this home more clearly than the U.N. Human Rights Council's report investigating Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip in 2008-09, which came very close to launching a legal process within the UN that could have produced a referral to the U.N. Security Council -- and possibly a war crimes tribunal. That's not going to happen, but it underscored already shifting international attitudes toward Israel.

Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has said 2010 would be the year of sanctions. His government was hoping for a year of action. Instead, Israel will wait.

Willis Sparks is Global Macro Analyst and Geoff Porter is Middle East & Africa Director at Eurasia Group. 

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By Eurasia Group analyst Alexander Kliment

The Obama administration's decision last Thursday to radically rework Washington's missile defense plans may have had more to do with reassuring Tel Aviv than placating Moscow. But when it comes to resetting U.S.-Russia ties, the move placed the ball squarely in the Kremlin's court.

One of the key goals of the Obama administration's "reset" with Russia has been to enlist Russian support for more robust multilateral sanctions against Iran. In recent years, the Bush administration's missile defense plan emerged as a key irritant in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Russian elites saw it as further evidence of a sinister Western plot of encirclement and feared, despite U.S. assurances, that the missile defense system could eventually be used against Russia's nuclear arsenal. In recent months, top Russian officials, including both Putin and Medvedev, have called on Washington to augment the reset rhetoric with concrete action. With its announcement on missile defense this month, Washington did just that.

In Moscow, the news was appreciated -- though perhaps with a somewhat inflated sense of the Russian dimension in Obama's thinking on the question -- but Russia's top generals are already screaming again about the unacceptability of any missile defense plan that does not explicitly include Russian participation. On Iran, Russia will likely show support during the engagement phase of U.S. and EU diplomacy with the Islamic Republic, but any Kremlin backing for harsher sanctions would reflect a significant, and very unlikely, change of heart. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly said, flatly, that Russia opposes harsher sanctions against Iran. 

Russia is unlikely to respond to the missile defense shift with any grand gesture as part of a "reset." The problem goes beyond missile defense -- Russia and the United States have fundamentally different views of what a reset means. For Washington, improved ties with Moscow are a foundation on which each country can work to accommodate the other's goal. In particular, Washington would like to see some flexibility in Moscow's position on key disputed issues: NATO expansion, Eurasian energy politics, and, crucially, Iran.

But the Russian elite, for its part, is divided. While some members of the liberal camp view Washington's overtures with cautious optimism, Putin and other important figures in the defense and military establishments see U.S. acceptance of Russia's position on these issues as a prerequisite for "hitting the reset button." In other words, Moscow thinks that a reset means Washington will reverse or change policies that the Kremlin considers antagonistic to Russia's interests. At the same time, Putin has made it clear that any moves by the United States to reverse perceived slights against Russia should not carry an expectation of reciprocity. The danger, then, is that Russia will simply view Washington's decision on missile defense as a welcome step, but not one that requires any similar moves by Russia. If Russia chooses to respond this way, any chance of a lasting reset will grind to a swift halt.

When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Moscow earlier this year to begin work on a reset in relations, the occasion was largely overshadowed by the translation gaffe in which the "reset" button she presented to Lavrov actually carried the Russian word for "overload." But the risk that Washington now faces in its Russia policy is not that the Kremlin will be "overloaded," but that its actions will, in fact, be underwhelming.

by Ian Bremmer

In Afghanistan, even the good news isn't so good. The country managed to hold a presidential election in August, but there aren't many people inside or outside the country who considered it free and fair. It looks increasingly like Hamid Karzai will win without a second round, but his legitimacy will remain under a very large, very dark cloud. He'll face open revolt from Tajiks in the north, who overwhelmingly opposed his candidacy. And as evidenced by the significant recent expansion of terrorist bombings in Afghanistan's major cities and the assassination last week of the country's second-ranking intelligence officer, it will even become harder to secure Kabul. No one should have much confidence that a second round would do much to restore Karzai's credibility.

In addition, military operations against the Taliban inside Pakistan achieved some actual success this summer, but that has probably pushed some militants across the border into Afghanistan to harass coalition forces there. U.S. casualties have increased, though that's not surprising given the more aggressive operations of larger numbers of US troops. But last week's U.S. bombing on a Taliban target, which killed dozens of civilians, is just the latest in a series of setbacks for coalition military operations.

More worrisome: It's becoming increasingly clear that Afghanistan won't be able to stand on its own anytime soon. U.S. military officials report that the training of Afghan soldiers is well behind schedule. For the next two or three years, with coalition forces at their present levels, Afghan troops won't be nearly strong enough to maintain even the current level of security, let alone make any meaningful contribution to an aggressive counterinsurgency effort.

Inside Afghanistan, more locals than ever want the US out, whatever the cost. There's also dwindling support for the war in the United States, as the American media increasingly turns its attention from an economy beginning to improve toward the growing death toll in Afghanistan.

Within the Obama foreign-policy team, there looks to be a growing divergence of opinion on what to do next. There appears to be an internal consensus that the current strategy isn't working. But senior officials appear more divided on whether to "go long" or "go home." In the go long group, those who want more troops and more resources because "failure isn't an option," we see Secretary Clinton, envoy Richard Holbrooke, most of the generals on the ground, and most Republicans in Congress. In the go home camp, those who want to pull troops out before things get much worse, are Vice President Biden, most of Obama's political team, and a growing number of senior Democrats. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates appears to have grown much more skeptical.

In short, Afghanistan is becoming Obama's first lasting foreign-policy crisis. A major terrorist attack somewhere in the world carried out by militants trained in Afghanistan could shift international public opinion toward greater engagement. Short of that, U.S. public opposition to the war will likely grow steadily over the coming year, bringing the issue to a head just in time for U.S. midterm elections and driving a wedge between members of the president's own party.

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By Eurasia Group analyst Philippe de Pontet

Last week's standoff between a handful of pirates and the U.S. Fifth Fleet had threatened to become a full-blown foreign-policy crisis before the dramatic rescue of Captain Richard Phillips gave President Obama a clear political win. Pirates are now less likely to target U.S. ships, but the White House is well aware that this episode won't do much to deter piracy elsewhere in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.

Just hours after Phillips's rescue, Somalia made headlines again. On Monday, Islamist insurgents in Mogadishu launched a mortar attack on a plane carrying Congressman Donald Payne (D-NJ), underscoring the multifaceted threats posed by state failure in that country. Piracy is one symptom of the problem; Islamic extremism is another. The attack by al-Shabaab fighters within 24 hours of the end of the piracy incident ensures that Somalia will remain on the Obama administration's front-burner -- and that the White House will face growing pressure to "get tough" on militants and pirates who use the failed state as a safe haven.

So, flush with its success and aware that the larger problem has not been solved, will the Obama administration up the ante by targeting pirates onshore in Somalia?

Probably not. It will likely focus instead on near-term efforts to bolster multilateral naval patrols (with more aggressive tactics) in the waters where pirates have attacked in the recent past, because the probable costs of onshore strikes would outweigh the likely benefits.

First, a direct, onshore U.S. strike on pirates would have only a limited impact on the broader piracy problem. Second, it could undermine efforts to contain Islamist militants by inviting them to tap into wounded Somali national pride, one of a very few forces that can unite divided clans. (Somali nationalism provided the Islamist movement with early legitimacy in the struggle to expel U.S.-backed Ethiopian troops from the country.) Third, it would weaken transitional President (and moderate Islamist) Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, a potential force for stability in a country that badly needs it.

African and Gulf governments and U.S. counter-terrorism officials are well aware that strikes could drive extremism in the region and help militants recruit local youth. But there's another risk: Pirates in Puntland, a region in Somalia's northeast where most of the pirates are based, have already threatened to kill some of the 270 hostages they now hold-hostages from countries all over the world, some of them key U.S. allies.

Targeted attacks remain under consideration. The UN Security Council approved a resolution late last year that would allow targeted military action against pirates on Somali territory. But for now, the Obama administration will likely opt for a lower-risk approach that keeps the focus offshore, while reviewing policy options and deepening intelligence on Somalia.

The pirates have now attacked enough private and commercial vessels to create a sense of vulnerability and frustration within many governments around the world. Washington will try to use this opportunity to ramp up multilateral patrolling operations in the Gulf of Aden, while giving U.S. warships greater latitude to launch offensive action against pirates at sea-including on identified "mother ships."

This policy carries risks of its own, including the creeping militarization of the Gulf of Aden and the waters of the Indian Ocean further from Somalia's shores. But this option will offer both security and political benefits while limiting the risk that another U.S. administration hits the rocks that lie just beneath Somalia's troubled waters. 

STEPHANE DE SAKUTIN/AFP/Getty Images 

by Ian Bremmer

The growing vulnerabilities of emerging markets to social upheaval and state failure as a result of the financial crisis is probably the most significant risk the world will face this year. That's why last week's G20 decision to significantly expand funding for the International Monetary Fund was so important -- and part of why the meeting itself was successful. This success is especially obvious once we accept the limits of what this forum can really accomplish. An urgent call for help was answered, but there was never any real chance that leaders would use this meeting to remake the international financial and economic order in a way that genuinely reflects the shift of recent years in the global balance of political and economic power.

But the seeds have been planted for longer-term problems. Chinese President Hu Jintao said very little during the event but was given an enormous level of respect by the other G20 participants and the media. This reflects the reality that many are now ready to accept China as a superpower. For the near term, this change will prove useful, because China has the money to help fund existing international financial institutions shepherd vulnerable countries through their domestic economic problems. But longer-term, it may become a problem, because China isn't fully ready to play this role and because China's leaders have fundamental disagreements with the leaders of other powerful states on how the global economic system should be governed. 

Looking ahead, the broader promise of a G20 remaking the international order for long-term sustainability remains unrealistic. Reimagining the architecture of any multinational effort -- not just of financial institutions but of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the composition of the United Nations Security Council, efforts to stop the international flow of illegal drugs, agreement on a single definition of "terrorism," a successor to the Kyoto protocols that will have a meaningful impact on climate change, and other difficult issues. That's just not possible in today's geopolitical environment. 

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