By Carroll Colley

Washington is on the verge of completing an improbable trifecta in U.S.-Russian relations. In August, the Obama administration helped guide Russia across the finish line for World Trade Organization membership. Congress is now fast tracking an end to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a piece of Cold War-era legislation that ties trade policy to human rights, and one that has remained a bone of contention between Moscow and Washington for more than twenty years. Finally, Congress is also about to establish "permanent normalized trade relations" with Russia.

So why are relations on the verge of a potentially serious turn for the worse-and perhaps a reassessment of the "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations? Because this legislation will also include the so-called Magnitsky Act, which publicly rebukes the Kremlin for its poor human rights record.

Sergei Magnitsky, an attorney investigating a corruption case involving tax fraud charges against a UK-based investment firm, announced he had uncovered evidence of collusion among police, organized crime figures, bankers, and the Russian judiciary to push the company out of business. In November 2008, Magnitsky was arrested on corruption charges and held for 11 months without trial. He then died in prison under disputed circumstances. An independent human rights organization, Moscow Helsinki Group, has accused Russian security of torturing him. Magnitsky's death provoked international criticism, but a defiant Russian government continues with a posthumous criminal case against him.

The Magnitsky Act will publicly name and shame Russian officials involved in the case, bar them from receiving US visas, and freeze any assets they hold in the United States. Moscow, as you might imagine, is incensed. The Kremlin sees the bill as evidence of continued anti-Russian sentiment in the United States - -Mitt Romney's campaign comments about Russia were grist for this mill -- and as an intrusion by the U.S. into Russia's domestic affairs. The House looks set to vote on the legislation tomorrow, the third anniversary of Magnitsky's death. The Kremlin promises to respond to the bill's passage by retaliating in kind.

The Magnitsky Act won't damage President Vladimir Putin inside Russia. He remains Russia's dominant political figure, his approval numbers are strong, and few Russians closely followed details of this case. Yet, Moscow remains extremely sensitive to international charges of human rights abuses and corruption of government officials. That leaders of Russia's nascent opposition movement have endorsed the Magnitsky Act aggravates the Kremlin even more.

Moscow has already floated suggestions for a 'black list' of US officials, including those connected with the extradition and trial of convicted arms dealer Viktor Bout or with the prison at Guantanamo Bay. Of more concern is the likelihood of increased pressure on U.S. industry operating in Russia, including, for example, unannounced tax inspections of U.S. companies, delayed or denied licensing or registration procedures, and other bureaucratic complications.

While the Magnitsky Act will punish those involved in the case, it won't do much to improve Russia's human rights regime in the near term. Several incidents since Putin's inauguration in May demonstrate that the state continues to use force to weaken the political opposition. Russian officials recently announced the arrest of political activist Leonid Razvozzhayev on charges of orchestrating a series of riots. Razvozzhayev insists that Russian security officials kidnapped him in Ukraine where he was applying for political asylum, transported him back to Russia, and gained a confession from him by torturing him and threatening his children. Politically connected murders of journalists and human rights activists are no closer to being resolved.

U.S.-Russian relations are now likely to enter a period of strain and recrimination, though pragmatism on both sides will prevent a total collapse. The U.S.-Russian "reset" was a good idea at the time and produced significant results, but there is only so much it can accomplish with so much continuing mistrust on both sides.

Carroll Colley is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Eurasia practice.

By Alexander Kliment

Vladimir Putin thinks that Russia's elections are over, and that it's time to move on with business as usual. The trouble for him -- and the system of "managed democracy" he has built -- is that Russia's season of elections is just beginning.

In his final address as Prime Minister to Russia's State Duma (the lower house of parliament) on Wednesday, Putin, who will return to the presidency on May 7, explained that in a "mature democracy, after elections are concluded there begins a more important phase of work." He called for unity and an end to the "heightened emotions" that have recently taken hold of Russia's politics.

So much for that. A few minutes later, the entire faction of the left-leaning Kremlin-created opposition party A Just Russia walked out of the hall in response to Putin's defiantly tin-eared response to a question about the disputed mayoral election in Astrakhan. In that city, the largest administrative center in Russia's Caspian littoral, A Just Russia member Oleg Shein has now entered the third week of a widely-publicized hunger strike to protest well-documented fraud in a mayoral vote that he lost on March 4, the very day that Putin was returned to the Kremlin.

The battle in Astrakhan, which anti-corruption crusader Alexey Navalny and other opposition figures have joined, follows a mayoral election in the northern city of Yaroslavl, where a former member of Putin's United Russia (UR) party ran as an independent, built unified support from several opposition groups, shrugged off scathing coverage from local media, and trounced the government's preferred candidate. More than a thousand election observers, mainly from Moscow, arrived to monitor the vote.

The controversies in Astrakhan and Yaroslavl have mainly to do with local issues, and Putin still has pre-eminent control of the country. United Russia, however tarnished by its new sobriquet as the "party of crooks and thieves," maintains its chokehold on the legislative and executive branches at all levels of Russian politics. But these local episodes underscore an emerging national reality: Opposition politics is taking root in Russia, and the regions will be the most fertile ground.

Despite Putin's wishful thinking, election season is far from finished. Later this year, regional legislative elections will be held in a half dozen localities. A similar number will vote in 2013 and 2014. By then, Russia's opposition forces may well have coalesced into a coherent national force, and voters will choose a new city council for Moscow, a city that Putin actually lost in last month's election.

Moreover, the Duma is expected to approve a bill in coming weeks that will reintroduce direct election of regional governors, though the president can still "filter" the candidates. Several regions could elect new leaders as early as this fall.

These elections will take place at a moment of unprecedented civil society activism, a trend that will cast a bright light on Russia's brand of democracy. Candidates for posts ultimately beholden to the Kremlin for their authority and resources must court an electorate increasingly skeptical of the prevailing power elite. Putin's "vertical of power," the system he has used to maintain political control across the country, already brittle thanks to the weakness of Russia's governing institutions, could begin to show real signs of stress as an increasingly restive public watches election results with new interest.

If so, the country's nascent opposition will have to begin to build a much broader infrastructure to help its leaders speak to a national audience about local problems. Change won't come quickly. Putin's approval rating stands at 68 percent, and Russia's economy is performing reasonably well. Moreover, few key regions face legislative or possible gubernatorial elections in coming months. But at the regional level, increased activism and attention from civil society and opposition groups, coupled with a threatening crisis of legitimacy for United Russia, could introduce a new element of unpredictability into local politics and, by extension, into center-regional relations.

Russia's opposition has a lot of building to do, but at least it now knows that a growing number of Russians are paying attention.

Alexander Kliment is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Eurasia practice.

Today, The Call presents our top risks for 2012. Click HERE for Eurasia Group's complete report.

1. The End of the 9/11 Era -- It was a truism of globalization: economics drives markets, and national security drives geopolitics. No longer. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the killing of Osama bin Laden, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and an end date for the war in Afghanistan, politics and economics will overlap almost entirely in 2012. Political officials around the world will worry mainly over economic risks -- the eurozone crisis, the strength of U.S. recovery, and China's evolving role in the global economy in 2012. Market players, in turn, are anxious mainly about political decisions, especially those that will be made in Europe, America, and China this year, as shortsighted leadership from virtually all the major geopolitical players generates policy stalemate and uncertainty.

2. G-Zero and the Middle East -- The inability/unwillingness of major powers to bolster the region's balance of force will generate greater turbulence across North Africa and the Middle East as unresolved religious, sectarian, and ethnic tensions threaten more unrest. The lack of a viable regional security framework, continuing protests, autocracies at risk, and enormous challenges facing newly democratic regimes will add to the potential turmoil. As this dynamic plays out in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, regional heavyweights -- Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey -- will generate friction as they vie for proxy influence.

3. Eurozone: the rollercoaster ride rolls on -- In Europe, it's not the breakup of the Eurozone we need to fear in 2012 but the "reactive incrementalism" that could spin beyond the control of political officials. The uncertainty and volatility we saw in 2011 has only just begun.

4. United States: right after elections -- Once the votes are counted in November, lawmakers will take up the $5 trillion worth of tax and savings decisions that must be taken in the final nine weeks of the year. Investors face uncertainty about their taxes and government contracts as well as about the broader impact of lawmakers' choices on economic growth.

5. North Korea: implosion or explosion -- The world's most opaque nuclear-armed state enters a year of uncertainty as the battle for power and influence within the regime gathers force.

6 - Pakistan: turmoil, spillover -- The end of the 9/11 era threatens neglect of other hotspots, and none is more combustible than Pakistan, a terrorism-plagued, nuclear-armed power burdened with an unpopular civilian government, a meddlesome military, politically motivated judges and an increasingly dangerous security environment. The expected withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops from Afghanistan this year will fuel regional competition for new influence.

7. China: trouble in the neighborhood -- The Obama administration's recent emphasis on Asia will embolden China's neighbors to take more assertive positions with Beijing. Rising nationalism in China, its ongoing political transition, and the leadership's unwillingness -- perhaps inability -- to resolve internal debates about the country's role in the world suggest Beijing is especially likely to meet provocation with provocation in months to come with both naval and economic muscle.

8. Egypt: a transition in trouble -- Egypt faces the risk of political disintegration this year as anger builds between military and civilian political forces, both Islamist and secular. Egypt's base-line stability, its economic recovery, and its broader regional influence will suffer.

9. South Africa: populism ascendant -- The struggle for leadership of the ruling African National Congress will slow the pace of both policy and economic growth at a time when the eurozone crisis already weighs heavily on South Africa's trade and currency.

10. Venezuela: a no-win election -- The country's big political story this year is October's presidential election, which incumbent Hugo Chavez, if healthy enough for a vigorous campaign, is likely to narrowly win. But the outlook for economic and political stability is bad no matter the election result. Should Chavez die or abandon the race, the deep fissures between the Chavista movement and the opposition could stoke violence.   

In addition, Eurasia Group identifies four red herrings, the big stories we don't believe will happen in 2012.

Fallout from the 2012 political transitions -- In 2012, we'll see political transitions in the U.S., China, Russia, and France, countries that together represent nearly half of global GDP and four-fifths of the UN Security Council. But there's surprisingly little at stake in the outcomes for geopolitics and the global economy.

Eurozone breakup -- This is probably the single most overrated risk of 2012. The political will to maintain the eurozone remains strong among all the major political parties in the core Eurozone states, almost across the board in the European periphery and, just as importantly, among eurocrats in the ever-growing European bureaucracy. And there's no effective political mechanism for a Eurozone breakup.

China's hard landing -- There are signs of overheated growth in China, but the state has the tools and resources to manage short-term trouble, and it will pull out every stop to prevent a serious slowdown, especially during a major political transition.

Mayan apocalypse -- Just isn't happening. And if it does, well, sorry.

Over the next three weeks, we'll be posting more ideas and information on each of these risks.

By Alex Brideau

President Viktor Yanukovych's government will face negative political, diplomatic, and economic effects from the Aug. 5 arrest of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the accompanying legal proceedings. Tymoshenko was detained on contempt of court charges during her trial for overstepping her authority as prime minister in concluding the 2009 gas import agreement with her Russian counterparts, and for pressing the local gas company Naftohaz Ukrainy to sign the contract. She could face up to ten years in prison if convicted.

Protests against the arrest and trial won't represent a threat to the government's short-term stability, but the arrest will help the opposition unify ahead of next year's parliamentary elections. It will also reinforce EU and U.S. views that the cases against Tymoshenko and her allies are politically motivated.

Tymoshenko's arrest is symbolically important because of the strong political overtones of the charges. Despite government claims to the contrary, investigations over the past year into corruption and misuse of government power have overwhelmingly targeted members of Tymoshenko's government, some of whom are still important opposition figures. Yanukovych's Regions of Ukraine party, which saw its support in June sink to only 11.7 percent in one poll and 16 percent in another, remains concerned that Tymoshenko could lead the opposition against them in the October 2012 parliamentary elections. If convicted, Tymoshenko would be automatically disqualified by law from running in the election.

Ongoing protests could grow if Tymoshenko is convicted and sentenced to prison. Yet protests are unlikely to grow to a size that would threaten order in the capital. Opposition parties do not appear to have the strength to sustain protests against the detention, and Tymoshenko's popularity -- polls show her support between 10 percent and 16 percent -- do not guarantee a large turnout. Furthermore, many of the capital's residents are on their summer vacation.

The arrest will nonetheless provide a rallying point for opposition parties ahead of next year's election campaign. Opposition parties aligned with supporters of the 2004 Orange Revolution have been divided since the 2007 parliamentary election, but local sources hint that they may work to overcome their differences and the arrest would make it easier.

The Russian Foreign Ministry's reaction may have the biggest impact in the short term. Moscow is unlikely to be overly critical of the Yanukovych government. But Russian officials do appear worried that the Tymoshenko trial is also an attempt to delegitimize the 2009 gas contract, and part of efforts to force its renegotiation.

Tymoshenko's trial is proceeding quickly, and it could end within the next month. With political figures and foreign governments believing that the case against her is politically motivated, the verdict in her trial will be viewed as a barometer of the trajectory of the Yanukovych government. A conviction could further strain ties with the West (and with Russia -- depending on how the government uses the verdict in gas talks). Yanukovych's supporters, on the other hand, might see acquittal as a sign that the president's power is weakening, which would hurt internal cohesion in the Regions party.

Alex Brideau is an analyst with Eurasia Group's Russia practice.

By Ian Bremmer and David Gordon

A wave of money flooding into emerging markets has lifted many boats. But when the tide goes out, certain countries -- and the investors betting on them -- may be left high and dry.

There are very different risk profiles among emerging markets, and even beyond the increasingly turbulent Middle East, not all are going to perform well this year. The risks facing these countries include negative economic policies (fiscal imbalances in some, premature austerity in others) as well as more purely political risks (including contentious elections and political violence). As these problems play out in 2011, they will contribute to poor investment outcomes, ranging from adverse regulatory changes to asset bubbles to weak stock market performance.

The most notable underperformers are Argentina, Hungary, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

In Argentina, investors appear overly optimistic that policy will improve -- either as a result of President Cristina Kirchner losing her re-election bid or a change in direction if she wins. In fact, she is likely to win, but policy is unlikely to change, leading to higher inflation and more populism.

In Hungary, markets have recently turned south, but still do not seem to be pricing in the scope of the potential impending crisis as the Fidesz government attacks asset holders across a range of classes. Hungary may once again have to turn to the IMF, but Prime Minister Viktor Orban has walked himself into a political corner with his vitriolic anti-IMF rhetoric.

Investors in Peru underestimate the potential for populist candidate Ollanta Humala to make a serious run at the presidency. He's a decided underdog to be sure, but it's too early to write him off. Even if the more market-friendly Alejandro Toledo wins, we're likely to see more resource nationalism -- and mild capital controls if the Peruvian sol continues to appreciate.

Despite its aspirations, South Africa won't improve its investment climate in 2011. Growing political pressure on President Jacob Zuma ahead of municipal elections in April-May and the ruling party leadership contest in 2012 will increase the risk of government inertia and erratic policy-making and reinforce the African National Congress (ANC)'s "single party rule" mentality."

Many people have become overconfident that the end of Sri Lanka's civil war will usher in a period of political stability. But President Mahinda Rajapakse, insecure in his position, is centralizing power while failing to address the country's structural challenges. That's a recipe for resurgent political and ethnic tension, and it will dampen growth prospects.

Finally, 2011 promises to be a year of political tension in Thailand, especially given the king's failing health. Allies of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra remain popular in much of the country, raising the risks of a violent, flawed election or a military intervention. There's real potential for serious and sustained unrest involving Thailand's incumbent elites and the pro-Thaksin "red-shirt" movement.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group. David Gordon is the firm's head of research.

The most obvious clue that Alexander Lukashenko's MySpace page is a fake is that it claims he has 315 friends. The Belarusian President has no friends -- at least none that can help him maintain his political footing. It's nice to have pals in Venezuela and Iran, but Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have moribund economies of their own to manage. That's why Belarus could become the latest former Soviet republic to face an economic and political storm.

Elections are coming in Belarus sometime in the next six months, and it doesn't take a crystal ball to know who's going to win. The opposition remains badly divided, and Lukashenko still controls the levers of power. He probably didn't need to rig the polls in 2006, yet he did it anyway. The need for a boost is more obvious this time, and he's likely to cheat again. In 2006, the fraudulent result triggered large public protests and scattered violence on the streets of Minsk. This time it's likely to be worse, and Moscow, the only valuable ally Lukashenko has ever had, is highly unlikely to throw him a life preserver.

In fact, the Russian government has had it with Lukashenko because it considers him a freeloader and an ingrate. The Belarusian president has scored political points at home by criticizing Moscow. Belarus has provided asylum to ousted Kyrgyz leader Bakiev, another authoritarian president who has antagonized neighboring Russia. Lukashenko has held up establishment of a customs union with Russia and Kazakhstan with demands for continuation of cheap oil and gas supplies from Russia.

The Belarusian economy is vulnerable. The economic slowdown among major trading partners in Europe and the former USSR has stalled the country's growth. Its current account deficit stands at 13 percent of GDP. Rising energy costs add to the problem as Gazprom, Russia's state-owned gas monopoly, pushes Belarus closer to market prices for gas.

With elections looming, Lukashenko's government is highly unlikely to cut state spending. He's right to wonder how long he would remain popular if he cut subsidies to help consumers buy fuel, froze wage and pension increases, and ended state spending that protects jobs.

And in response to the phony election of 2006 and the state crackdown on demonstrations that followed, the United States and the EU imposed sanctions. There's little reason to think they won't do it again if Lukashenko turns to the same old tricks.

Moscow won't shed any tears as Lukashenko flounders. Russian media have opened up on him in recent weeks, portraying him as an obnoxious, narcissistic thug. Prime Minister Putin doesn't work very hard to disguise his contempt.

Moscow is in best position to make Lukashenko more uncomfortable. As his relations with Moscow have worsened, Russia has moved to sharply reduce the energy subsidies that fuel the Belarusian refining industry -- and the broader economy. This year, Russia imposed full oil export duties on supplies and threatened to charge netback parity prices for gas next year. When Russia cut gas deliveries by 60 percent, Belarus threatened to up the stakes by passing the pain onto Europe. Russia supplies a quarter of the European Union's gas demand and pumps about 20 percent of the total through Belarus. The Russians, who can simply reroute those supplies through Ukraine, were not impressed. The two sides reached a compromise on Moscow's terms.

Russian-Belarusian energy supply and transit contracts must be renegotiated by the end of this year. A fight over energy is likely, and Belarus may face more supply cuts and damage to trade relations in other sectors that could generate turmoil throughout the Belarusian economy -- in the dead of winter and the middle of an election campaign.

If Russia really wants to punish the Belarusian president, it could refuse to recognize the election results. Moscow is highly unlikely to push that hard, but Belarus certainly looks like the next former Soviet state that could see some dangerous upheaval in coming months.

Remember the "colored revolutions," the mostly peaceful uprisings that were said to mark a turning point in the history of the post-Soviet space? In 2003, we had Georgia's Rose Revolution, which replaced President (and former Soviet foreign minister) Edvard Shevardnadze with a young U.S.-educated lawyer named Mikhail Saakashvili. In 2004, a fraudulent presidential election result was overturned by popular outrage in Ukraine, lifting Viktor Yushchenko past Viktor Yanukovych. In 2005, Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution elevated Kurmanbek Bakiyev to the presidency. Georgia and Ukraine have since talked of joining NATO. Kyrgyzstan continues to allow American forces to use an air force base in its territory as a line of resupply for troops in Afghanistan.

Western media celebrated these events as victories for democracy, and the Kremlin fumed over what it considered further Western encroachment into Russia's sphere of influence.

Since then, Saakashvili has stumbled into a brief but costly war with Russia, and he faces a rising chorus of complaints at home. Yushchenko left the presidency with a single-digit approval rating, and Ukrainian voters have elected Yanukovych president. And now Kyrgyzstan's Bakiyev has come face to face with a depth of fury he was not prepared to handle.

We shouldn't be surprised by the trouble in the Kyrgyz Republic. Half the population lives below the poverty line. Remittances from Kyrgyz working abroad, a vital source of revenue, have not recovered from the global slowdown. Rising fuel and utility prices, a crackdown on media, and public anger over widespread corruption and nepotism add to the list of grievances. Bakiyev won elections widely considered fraudulent in 2007 and again in 2009. In 2007, he claimed his party had won every seat in parliament.

Whatever the cause of this latest bout of post-Soviet turmoil, we've reached an important point: The last of the colored revolutions has gone south, and Russia may soon regain more of its lost influence across this strategically important region.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? (Portfolio, May 2010)

By Ian Bremmer and David Gordon

Now for the red herrings, the places and problems where we think there is less risk than meets the eye.

In Iraq, elections in March will spark violence as foreign militants try to undermine the transition to Iraqi national sovereignty. A U.S. troop withdrawal beginning right after the elections will invite more violence. We could see a Sunni election boycott. But compared to what we've seen before, and what might have happened, the overall story is remarkably positive. For the markets, Iraq is suddenly an opportunity. The institutions are becoming legitimate (even with the unresolved Kurdish issue), the army is starting to work, and most importantly, political leaders from all communities are beginning to recognize the value of Iraq's tremendous natural resource base from which all can benefit if they make the compromises to maintain stability in the country. For all their basic governance problems, there's very little chance of Iraq actually becoming a failed state at this point -- a meaningful risk even a year ago. It's not a place we're ready to vacation in, but we're bullish on Iraq.

Iraq is also moving in a positive geopolitical direction. Ties with Turkey have grown particularly quickly -- not just in the Kurdish region in the north, but in Baghdad. That's one of the few positive stories for Ankara this year. Arab states in the region are still hesitant to build ties with Iraq as they wait for clarity on its next government. Maliki hasn't been a popular figure with neighboring gulf Arabs, but they recognize that Iraq's economic consolidation won't wait for another four years, and they'll start making political overtures to Baghdad if Maliki's mandate is extended. And if the Iraqi prime minister isn't returned (which is certainly plausible), we'll see a stream of head of state visits to place relations with a new leader on a more solid footing. So whatever the electoral outcome in March, we're likely to see Iraq on a faster path to integration with regional political and economic infrastructure next year. Meanwhile, Iran's role in Iraq has quietly receded. Iran's controversial presidential election and subsequent state violence did nothing to improve Tehran's influence among Iraq's Shia population, where Iraqi nationalism has been steadily growing.

The headlines for Iraq next year will undoubtedly be the timing/delays/pace of the US troop withdrawal. But the real story is going to be a moderate government, growing geopolitical influence, and the most exciting new investment opportunities the region has seen in a decade.

Read on

By Ian Bremmer

It looks like we're headed for another political showdown in Turkey, where the ruling Justice and Development Party, known by its Turkish acronym AKP, has taken a series of actions that will (yet again) antagonize the country's secular establishment in general, and the military in particular.

Secular critics, particularly among the business, media, and military elites, charge that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP means to undermine Turkey's constitution by gradually replacing secularism with Islamism. AKP supporters insist that the party champions religious freedom but poses no threat to Turkey's constitution or its secularist principles.

Following a landslide election victory in 2007, the AKP moved last year to lift a ban on the wearing of headscarves in Turkey's universities. A public prosecutor charged the move violated the constitution's secularist foundation and launched a legal challenge to shut the party down. The case moved to the Constitutional Court, where the AKP government survived by one vote.

Far from chastened, the ruling party is now moving more decisively to assert political authority over the military. On June 26, a late-night legal maneuver without support from the opposition led to passage of a law that will allow army personnel to face trial in civilian (rather than military) courts. There was no debate prior to the vote, and the main opposition party promises to ask the Constitutional Court to strike the law down.

On July 21, the government's Higher Education Board adopted a new rule that will make it easier for graduates of religious schools to gain admission to universities, a hot-button issue for secularists who argue that these schools are incubators of religious extremists.

But the biggest news came earlier this week, when 56 people accused of plotting to overthrow the AKP-led government, including two retired four-star generals, went on trial in the next phase of the so-called Ergenekon investigation. The generals are the most senior military officers ever to stand trial in modern Turkey. Keep in mind, this is a country where the army has overthrown four governments since 1960-though on each occasion, the military has withdrawn relatively quickly and allowed for the restoration of civilian rule.

Since the Ergenekon investigation began two years ago after police discovered a box of grenades in the Istanbul home of a junior military officer, more than 140 people have been charged with membership in the "Ergenekon armed terrorist organization." Eighty-six suspects have been on trial for the past nine months. Fifty-two more were indicted this week.

Prosecutors claim Ergenekon is a nationwide network of people dedicated to destroying the twice-elected AKP government and that it has engaged in terrorist attacks, extortion, and drug trafficking. Many AKP critics charge that Ergenekon doesn't exist and that the ongoing probe is a political stunt meant to intimidate and discredit the secularist opposition. The ongoing arrests and prosecutions are pushing Turkey's politics from simmer toward boil, and the risk is growing that an uneasy truce between the AKP and the military is in jeopardy -- and that another legal attempt to close the party might follow.

All this at a moment when Turkish officials should be focused on stabilizing the domestic economy, undertaking much-needed economic reforms, managing relations with the IMF to ensure external financial support, and putting the country's bid to join the European Union back on track. It's a bad time for an all-out fight, but that's exactly what appears to be brewing.

MUSTAFA OZER/AFP/Getty Images