South Asia

by Ian Bremmer

In Afghanistan, even the good news isn't so good. The country managed to hold a presidential election in August, but there aren't many people inside or outside the country who considered it free and fair. It looks increasingly like Hamid Karzai will win without a second round, but his legitimacy will remain under a very large, very dark cloud. He'll face open revolt from Tajiks in the north, who overwhelmingly opposed his candidacy. And as evidenced by the significant recent expansion of terrorist bombings in Afghanistan's major cities and the assassination last week of the country's second-ranking intelligence officer, it will even become harder to secure Kabul. No one should have much confidence that a second round would do much to restore Karzai's credibility.

In addition, military operations against the Taliban inside Pakistan achieved some actual success this summer, but that has probably pushed some militants across the border into Afghanistan to harass coalition forces there. U.S. casualties have increased, though that's not surprising given the more aggressive operations of larger numbers of US troops. But last week's U.S. bombing on a Taliban target, which killed dozens of civilians, is just the latest in a series of setbacks for coalition military operations.

More worrisome: It's becoming increasingly clear that Afghanistan won't be able to stand on its own anytime soon. U.S. military officials report that the training of Afghan soldiers is well behind schedule. For the next two or three years, with coalition forces at their present levels, Afghan troops won't be nearly strong enough to maintain even the current level of security, let alone make any meaningful contribution to an aggressive counterinsurgency effort.

Inside Afghanistan, more locals than ever want the US out, whatever the cost. There's also dwindling support for the war in the United States, as the American media increasingly turns its attention from an economy beginning to improve toward the growing death toll in Afghanistan.

Within the Obama foreign-policy team, there looks to be a growing divergence of opinion on what to do next. There appears to be an internal consensus that the current strategy isn't working. But senior officials appear more divided on whether to "go long" or "go home." In the go long group, those who want more troops and more resources because "failure isn't an option," we see Secretary Clinton, envoy Richard Holbrooke, most of the generals on the ground, and most Republicans in Congress. In the go home camp, those who want to pull troops out before things get much worse, are Vice President Biden, most of Obama's political team, and a growing number of senior Democrats. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates appears to have grown much more skeptical.

In short, Afghanistan is becoming Obama's first lasting foreign-policy crisis. A major terrorist attack somewhere in the world carried out by militants trained in Afghanistan could shift international public opinion toward greater engagement. Short of that, U.S. public opposition to the war will likely grow steadily over the coming year, bringing the issue to a head just in time for U.S. midterm elections and driving a wedge between members of the president's own party.

MANPREET ROMANA/AFP/Getty Images

By Eurasia Group analysts Seema Desai and Maria Kuusisto

While no one’s launching a full revival of the India-Pakistan peace process yet, conversations are beginning to take place in the wings. On June 15, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari met for the first time since the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Largely because of U.S. diplomatic pressure, they agreed to this brief discussion and public appearance on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Russia.

Although the meeting demonstrates that Delhi and Islamabad may be willing to resume some sort of dialogue, both Singh and Zardari remain constrained by the hard-line sentiments of their domestic constituencies. India wants clear signs that Pakistan is cracking down on extremist elements within its borders. Meanwhile, the Pakistani government is under pressure from the military, which remains suspicious of India. And Pakistan's recent release of a prominent militant from house arrest has undermined prospects of cooperation.

From the U.S. perspective, the Obama administration sees easing India-Pakistan tension as an essential part of its regional stabilization strategy. It would enable the Pakistani military to focus on fighting the Taliban along the Afghan border and defuse covert and overt support for the Taliban and other extremists. In early June, the United States launched a diplomatic push, sending U.S. Special Representative Richard Holbrooke and Under-secretary of State William Burns to South Asia; Secretary of State Hilary Clinton will visit India and Pakistan in July.

India and Pakistan are sensitive to U.S. pressure: Islamabad needs U.S. financial assistance, and Delhi is keen to deepen the George W. Bush–era engagement. As a result, Delhi and Islamabad both made positive comments on the peace process around the Holbrooke-Burns visits, but they remain deeply sensitive to domestic forces, which will ultimately prevent deep engagement right now. And neither government wants to be seen as giving in to U.S. pressure, making a return to the results-oriented, pre-Mumbai composite dialogue highly unlikely.

Arif Ali/AFP/Getty Images

By Ian Bremmer

In the Pakistani city of Lahore on Tuesday, a dozen gunmen attacked a bus carrying members of Sri Lanka's cricket team, killing six policemen and a driver and injuring several of the athletes. Press accounts of the assault suggest a level of coordination similar to that used by the Pakistan-based militants who killed 173 people at several sites in Mumbai in September. Across Pakistan, suicide bombers killed two people in 2005, six in 2006, 56 in 2007, and 61 in 2008. Suicide attackers killed more people in Pakistan last year than in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

There are two important reasons why the threat of global terrorism is growing. The first is long-term and structural. The second is more directly tied to the global financial crisis. Both have everything to do with what's happening in Pakistan.

First, a report released in December from the U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism hints at both sets of problems. The report notes an increasing supply of nuclear technology and material around the world and warns that "without greater urgency and decisive action by the world community, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."

Destructive (and potentially destructive) technologies are now more accessible than at any time in history for small groups and even individuals. This will dramatically increase the baseline threat of disruptive violence from non-state actors over time. It's not just biological and nuclear material. GPS tracking devices help pirates operating off Somalia's coast venture further from shore and undertake increasingly ambitious attacks on private and commercial vessels.

Second, it's unlikely that we'll see the "greater urgency and decisive action by the world community" called for in the report. For the moment, political leaders around the world are too busy wrestling with the effects of the global financial crisis on their domestic economies (and their political standing) to coordinate action against such a diffuse threat.

But there's another reason why the financial crisis heightens the risk of global terrorism. Militants thrive in places where no one is fully in charge. The global recession threatens to create more such places.

No matter how cohesive and determined a terrorist organization, it needs a supportive environment in which to flourish. That means a location that provides a steady stream of funds and recruits and the support (or at least acceptance) of the local population. Much of the counter-terrorist success we've seen in Iraq's al Anbar province over the past two years is a direct result of an increased willingness of local Iraqis to help the Iraqi army and US troops oust the militants operating there. In part, that's because the area's tribal leaders have their own incentives (including payment in cash and weaponry) for cooperating with occupation forces. But it's also because foreign militants have alienated the locals.

The security deterioration of the past year in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects exactly the opposite phenomenon. In the region along both sides of their shared border, local tribal leaders have yet to express much interest in helping Pakistani and NATO soldiers target local or foreign militants. For those with the power to either protect or betray the senior al-Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in the region, NATO and Pakistani authorities have yet to find either sweet enough carrots or sharp enough sticks to shift allegiances.  

The slowdown threatens to slow the progress of a number of developing countries. Most states don't provide ground as fertile for militancy as places like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. But as more people lose their jobs, their homes, and opportunities for prosperity -- in emerging market countries or even within minority communities inside developed states -- it becomes easier for local militants to find volunteers. 

This is why the growing risk of attack from suicide bombers and well-trained gunmen in Pakistan creates risks that extend beyond South Asia. This is a country that is home to lawless regions where local and international militants thrive, nuclear weapons and material, a history of nuclear smuggling, a cash-starved government, and a deteriorating economy. Pakistan is far from the only country in which terrorism threatens to spill across borders. But there's a reason why the security threats flowing back and forth across the Afghan-Pakistani border rank so highly on Eurasia Group's list of top political risks for 2009 -- and why they remain near the top of the Obama administration's security agenda.

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