Israel/Palestine

By Willis Sparks and Geoff Porter

As the world focuses on the diplomatic tug of war over Iran's nuclear program, Israel lives with the worrying hum of all those centrifuges spinning just a thousand miles to the east. Yet, Benjamin Netanyahu's government knows that if Israel launches airstrikes, there's a limit to how much damage can be done and how long Iran's progress can be delayed. It therefore has to persuade the Obama administration -- and anyone else who might help slow Iran's march -- to see the risks from Iran as Israel sees them.

It helped that Iran recently revealed the existence of an undeclared nuclear site near the city of Qom. At the very least, that revelation of Iranian dishonesty might have made it a little more difficult for Beijing and Moscow to justify continued resistance to sanctions. Yet, Israel remained quiet. Suddenly it appeared Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and National Security Advisor Uzi Arad might have a wind at their backs. Though they'd like the wind to blow a bit more steadily and to get them to their destination quicker, they can't risk the rhetoric that might label them as blowhards.

But now there's talk of a diplomatic breakthrough. Following talks in Geneva with negotiators from the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany, Iran has signed on to a tentative "interim agreement" to accept a U.S.-Russian proposal (that has been on the table for more than a year) to ship much of its low enriched uranium outside the country for reprocessing. Ensuring that this uranium is processed outside the country would help verify that it's used for civilian, not military, purposes. And then over the weekend, Iran ostensibly agreed to allow IAEA inspectors into the Qom facility on Oct. 25.

This leaves the Israeli government in a bind. First, because the details have yet to be worked out and Iran could renounce a completed agreement at any time, Israel can't take much comfort from it. Second, the fact that others treat it as a potential diplomatic breakthrough makes it even less likely than before that Israel could justify military strikes or that the US can persuade Russia and (especially) China to support sanctions tough enough to make any difference in Iran's strategic planning.

Israel has no faith that the potential for diplomatic détente between Iran and the US and EU is anything more than an Iranian stalling tactic, buying Tehran more time to speed toward the nuclear finish line. Likewise, Israel doesn't believe that sanctions -- no matter how tough they are -- will back Iran down. For Israel, diplomacy and sanctions are merely different forms of delay, but Netanyahu has little choice but to wait them out.

He'll be waiting for some time. First, diplomacy has to run its course. Following the tentative agreement in Geneva and the announcement that Iran will allow inspection of its Qom facility, the diplomatic track seems to be gaining momentum. Once that momentum slows and stalemate resumes, sanctions will be debated and some of them will be implemented. That won't happen before spring 2010 at the earliest.

In the meantime, Israel has little choice but to sit on its hands. Netanyahu knows that strikes on Iran's nuclear sites during delicate negotiations would inflict much more damage to Israel's international reputation -- and its relations with Washington, in particular -- than to Iran's nuclear program. Nothing brings this home more clearly than the U.N. Human Rights Council's report investigating Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip in 2008-09, which came very close to launching a legal process within the UN that could have produced a referral to the U.N. Security Council -- and possibly a war crimes tribunal. That's not going to happen, but it underscored already shifting international attitudes toward Israel.

Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has said 2010 would be the year of sanctions. His government was hoping for a year of action. Instead, Israel will wait.

Willis Sparks is Global Macro Analyst and Geoff Porter is Middle East & Africa Director at Eurasia Group. 

Alex Wong/Getty Images

By Eurasia Group analyst Geoff Porter

Even as President Obama tries to open diplomatic channels with Tehran, Israel will likely try to address real and potential threats from Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran's regional proxies. Israel has already waged war on Hamas in recent months, and military confrontation with Hezbollah is becoming more likely.

Iran's nuclear progress and Obama administration efforts at engaging Iran's leaders have generated high anxiety in official circles within Israel, where the Iranian nuclear program is widely considered an existential threat to the Jewish state. Israelis from across the political spectrum doubt that a new diplomatic track will persuade Iran to halt its nuclear program. Many believe that Iran will simply exploit the diplomatic process and warming relations with Washington to play for time, advancing its nuclear program beyond a point at which neither diplomacy nor military strikes can compromise Iran's nuclear future.

For the moment, Israel seems to be giving the US diplomatic track time to produce results. But in the meantime, Israel will focus on Iran-related problems that it can address directly, like the threats posed by Hezbollah and Hamas, before these groups benefit from the added political leverage their ties with a nuclear Iran would generate. In short, Israel fears that once Iran has achieved nuclear status, Hamas and Hezbollah will feel emboldened to take a more aggressive approach toward Israel. Better to deal with those groups' offensive capabilities now, some Israeli officials reason, than to wait until US/European diplomatic efforts fail and Iran crosses the nuclear threshold.

Because Israel officially considers Hezbollah and Hamas terrorist organizations, Israel will not open negotiations with either of them. As a consequence, Israeli policymakers may determine that further militarily action is a necessary risk. Israel severely weakened Hamas in December and January, and government officials continue to publicly underline threats from Hezbollah that continue following their six-week conflict in 2006.

A wrong step from Hezbollah in coming months would provide Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government with the pretext to strike at Hezbollah's capabilities. Rocket fire across the Lebanese-Israeli border could provoke Israeli retaliation, just as it did in 2006 when a Hezbollah campaign unexpectedly drew a massive Israeli response. And the current Israeli government is much more hawkish than the Ehud Olmert-led government of 2006.

How might this confrontation develop? Following this weekend's Lebanese legislative elections, Hezbollah might make good on threats to avenge the killing of member Imad Mughniyeh, which the group blames on Israel. For the moment, Hezbollah is concentrating its time and resources on its performance at the ballot box, but its leadership is unlikely to let his death go without a response. Any provocative action from Hezbollah is highly likely to draw a forceful Israeli response.

There is also a potential domestic political rationale underlying a future Israeli attack on Hezbollah. While the 2006 Israeli campaign against Hezbollah was politically damaging for Olmert's administration (and ultimately cost defense minister Amir Peretz his job), the recent offensive against Hamas was domestically popular and bolstered support for Ehud Barak, Peretz's replacement.

A successful strike on Hezbollah would be significantly more difficult to achieve than the recent attacks on Hamas. But if the Netanyahu government sets clear, attainable goals and successfully manages the Israeli public's expectations, it could improve its standing. Some good news might come in handy, given the economic challenges the government now faces, problems which have undermined its popularity in recent weeks.

Netanyahu is struggling to maintain an awkward hard-right coalition despite falling tax receipts, rising unemployment, and increasing fiscal demands for social services. In a recent Knesset speech, Netanyahu emphasized that the economic challenges that Israel faces are compounded by security threats. While the global economic downturn may prevent Netanyahu from unilaterally turning Israel's economy around, he may reckon that Israel can deal with security risks on its own.

By Eurasia Group analysts Geoff Porter and Willis Sparks

The new Israeli government has wasted no time in confirming its hawkish reputation on both Iran's nuclear program and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Blunt comments from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman signal a risky road ahead -- and an increasingly uneasy relationship between the U.S. and Israeli governments.

Netanyahu entered office with a warning: If the U.S. administration does not lead the charge in halting Iran's nuclear ambitions, Israel may decide that it has no choice but to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. And his new foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the hard-line Yisrael Beiteinu party, has argued that Israel is not bound to abide by understandings reached between the previous Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. He added that Israelis should perhaps prepare for war rather than peace.

Whether he is truly prepared to give the order to target Iran's nuclear facilities any time soon, Netanyahu's comments on Iran represent an effort to influence the Obama administration's approach to Iran, one that has begun with a call from Washington for a more constructive relationship with Tehran. The new Israeli prime minister wants to ensure that the Obama administration keeps its pledges to block Iran's nuclear program at the top of its agenda -- that it understands Israel can't afford to allow negotiations with Iran to drag on indefinitely. Israel will deliver that message again in June with a civil defense exercise that simulates multiple missile strikes on Israeli territory.  Israel will also probably try to weaken Iran's regional proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah -- particularly if a U.S.-led diplomatic track makes airstrikes on Iran less feasible.

The next three months will represent a period of heightened risk ahead of Iran's presidential elections on June 12. In addition to the Israeli warnings, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could face a tough challenge from Mir Hossein Mousavi, a popular former prime minister who has criticized Ahmadinejad's mismanagement of an economy plagued by high inflation and gasoline rationing. Aggressive Israeli rhetoric could provide Ahmadinejad an opportunity to provoke an international crisis to rally Iranians to his government -- and to boost his position in the polls.

If Netanyahu's comments were predictable, Lieberman's were much stronger than expected. Though consistent with his previous positions on the Palestinians, Lieberman's statements offered a sharp contrast with Netanyahu's recent pledge that his government would work to ensure continuity on the Palestinian issue from the previous government to his own.

It's no surprise that the choice of Avigdor Lieberman will add an element of friction in US-Israeli relations, but his assertion that Israel is not bound by commitments made during the U.S.-brokered Annapolis negotiations will cause some serious heartburn in Washington. The Obama administration believes that a visible commitment to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will restore U.S. credibility across the Middle East and help it advance its diplomatic agenda in other countries. Lieberman's comments will make the Obama administration's goal that much harder to achieve for as long as this new Israeli government remains in power.

by Ian Bremmer

As President Shimon Peres begins consultations with Benjamin Netanyahu, Tzipi Livni, and others over formation of the next Israeli government, let's take a step back and a longer-term view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Over the course of the next few years, the problem will likely get worse, not so much because of who will lead the Israeli government, Hamas, Fatah or Hezbollah, but because inevitable technological changes will tilt the balance toward intensified conflict.

Israelis have proven many times that they're tough and creative enough to face down new threats to their security. But in the not-too-distant future, militants will have weaponry that is technologically sophisticated enough to effectively target Tel Aviv from outside Israel -- from outside even the "buffer zone" established in southern Lebanon by international peacekeepers to keep Israeli Defense Forces and Hezbollah further apart following their war in 2006. Once Hezbollah can hit Tel Aviv with a rocket equipped with a relatively sophisticated guidance system from anywhere inside Lebanon, life will be much tougher for Israelis.

Everyone knows that Israel is a small country. But many outsiders don't realize that more than half its population -- and the core of its economy -- are based in and around Tel Aviv. That makes the country and its security especially vulnerable to longer-range, increasingly accurate ballistic missiles.

I'm not talking about a threat to Israel's very existence. This is a country that's been in plenty of tougher fights over the past six decades. But as Tel Aviv becomes directly vulnerable, Israel's extremely mobile and globalized population -- and its strong activist diaspora -- will become a weakness, because they will be the most vulnerable to attack and the first to leave. We've seen this problem in other countries with strong diasporas -- like Armenia and Lebanon -- both of which hollowed out economically as a result.

At that point, there's a risk of a sharp shift to the right in Israeli politics, much sharper and further to the right than the one we've seen in recent months. Under this circumstance, we'd likely see the most democratic government in the region in much more direct conflict with Israeli Arabs. We'd also see a spike in violence in Gaza, the West Bank, and within Israel's borders.

Once this point is reached, Israelis, Palestinians, the United States, and the governments of neighboring Arab states will find themselves at a fork in the road. The more optimistic view is that the potential for regional conflagration will force the United States and Arab governments to step in with pressure (and promises of funding), to create their own security and economic solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, the Jordanians could take on the burden of the West Bank with Egyptians doing the same in Gaza. That requires a high degree of political stability and self-confidence in Egypt and Jordan, and it could only work if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict already threatened them far more directly than it does now. There are other possible solutions, but the principle problem, as with so many other "intractable conflicts" around the world, is that no consensus in favor of a solution can be reached within the international community until the conflict reaches a hard boil and threatens to spill across borders.

The second scenario, wholly possible, is that Arab states can't agree on a way forward and instead make demands on Israel that its increasingly embattled population won't allow its government to accept. Under this scenario, there is a much higher likelihood that Israel would become economically unviable and an isolated political pariah -- one that cannot count on support even from the United States. That's a very bad scenario for the broader Middle East. 

Which scenario is more likely? I'm an optimist, and the Arab countries in question are probably moderate enough to agree on a way forward that averts worst-case scenarios for the region. But we can't discount the problem of Arab infighting and indecision, even in the face of potential disaster. I'll go with the first scenario as the more likely, but not with much confidence.

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