North Korea

By Ian Bremmer

The international conflict over North Korea's nuclear program has been locked in stalemate for years. The United States and Japan fear that Pyongyang will sell nuclear weapons and material to rogue regimes and/or terrorist groups or stumble its way into a shooting war. China and South Korea worry that North Korea will collapse, flooding Chinese border regions with sick and starving refugees and leaving South Korea with a reunification project that will cost a fortune and last a generation. This problem has allowed Kim Jong Il to periodically saber-rattle his way into fresh supplies of cash, food, and fuel. It's all been entirely predictable.

But the Dear Leader's illness has changed the game. His government has been unusually belligerent lately, even by North Korean standards. Following the latest missile tests, they haven't made new demands for talks or aid and insist they will not return to six-party talks until others at the table accept North Korea as a nuclear state. Its government has since sentenced two US journalists to 12 years of hard labor for "hostilities against the Korean nation and illegal entry." Especially provocative have been a series of cyber-attacks on US and South Korean government websites, which officials in both countries believe originated from North Korea. This more reckless North Korean behavior suggests that senior civilian and military officials, increasingly unsure how the coming power transition will go, are trying to secure some extra room for maneuver.

For the moment, North Korean actions are aimed at an internal, not an international, audience. That makes their actions less predictable -- and increases the risk of accidental confrontation.

The Obama administration, aware that bad things happen when all sides are in escalation mode at the same time, has stepped back from the tougher rhetoric of weeks past. There's been little mention of sanctions. For the imprisoned journalists, Secretary of State Clinton is now asking for mercy rather than demanding justice.

But if North Korea really is moving into political succession mode as Kim Jong Il's health heads downhill, those who will be left behind are making a much-faster-than-planned move to shore up support for his recently designated successor, third son Kim Jong Un. It will be easier for them to maintain national unity at a time when the country stands on the brink of war.

Until the North Korean leadership feels confident enough to return to the established patterns of negotiation and extortion, its actions will remain much more difficult to predict. That problem, in turns, elevates the risk of miscalculation -- and a confrontation that no one wants.

AUM JUNG-SEOK/AFP/Getty Images

By Ian Bremmer

The George W. Bush administration learned the limits of a policy approach to America's antagonists (like Iran and North Korea) that relies almost exclusively on political pressure and economic coercion. Even as Washington issued warning after warning, Iran made enormous progress toward a nuclear capability, and North Korea amassed a small nuclear arsenal.

But the Obama administration is now learning the limits of constructive engagement. Iran is ignoring U.S. calls for an end to a crackdown on Iranian demonstrators, and North Korea is threatening the United States with a "fire shower of nuclear retaliation." What do we learn from this? That, as time passes, U.S. policymakers have less and less ability to influence events within isolated countries and the choices made by their leaders.

In fact, events inside Iran over the past two weeks represent something close to a worst-case scenario for Washington. Since Obama became president, his tactical approach to Iran has been governed by a simple principle: Don't do or say anything that will help Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad use Washington to rally support. That was a wise choice, but one that came to nothing because, as Joseph Stalin once observed, "It's not he who votes that counts but he who counts the votes."

Obama responded to the stolen election and the protests that followed with characteristic caution, using vivid language of condemnation only after the level of violence in Tehran demanded it. But it will be harder now to make the deal he wants over Iran's nuclear program, because whatever he offers Iran will open him to charges of "appeasement," and because Iran's weakened government will likely respond to U.S. warnings with renewed belligerence.

On North Korea, whatever the president's approach, uncertainty within that country is generating a level of anti-American vitriol that's unusual even by North Korean standards. Kim Jong-Il has apparently tapped his 26 year-old son, Kim Jung Un, to succeed him. Whether this latest of the Kims will actually rule or the North Korean military will wield new power within a kind of dictatorship by committee, we can only guess. But it's clear that, for the moment, U.S. officials can plan for various contingencies and respond to events, but can't do much to influence what comes next.

The Obama approach to these problems is to try to keep as many options open as possible. That might help to protect him against the charges of hubris that rained down on Bush-era neocons, but it also allows others who don't play by the same rulebook to outmaneuver him. Political decision-makers inside Iran and North Korea are now defining the terms of their engagement with the United States.

By Ian Bremmer

North Korea could become Obama's first true foreign-policy crisis. The country's second nuclear test has drawn international condemnation --including some unusually tough language from China -- and we'll surely see a UN Security Council resolution expressing more of the same. But there's just not much policy flexibility here, and therefore not many ways of cooling things off.

The six party talks were already broken down, and the North Koreans had been steadily upping the ante over the past two months -- with increasingly belligerent rhetoric, the arrest of two American journalists, and new satellite and missile test launches. None of these actions has brought the North Koreans much satisfaction, and they've contributed to a harder-line Obama administration response than was otherwise likely -- including the push through of yet another UN Security Council resolution and the establishment of preconditions for new talks.

It's hard to know how much of North Korea's aggressiveness flows from economic necessity and how much suggests a shift toward a more overtly hostile policy. But it's perfectly clear that Pyongyang is responding to a geopolitical squeeze that it has found increasingly uncomfortable.

This is not simply "belligerent business as usual," and the second nuclear test is a big deal for the North Koreans. First, they know they're crossing a "red line" for their friends in Beijing. (Apparently, North Korea took the unusual step of giving the United States a one-hour heads-up before the test, while saying nothing to Beijing.) Second, they only have enough nuclear fuel for a very small arsenal (perhaps 6-8 devices in total). In other words, they knew in advance they better make this test count.

Tensions will likely subside for a few weeks. The Obama administration has responded with the diplomatic equivalent of outrage but will ultimately need to back off preconditions and recognize the need to return to the bargaining table -- particularly since this will be the price for China to continue to focus its frustration on Pyongyang. The next question will be at what point the United States and China turn the economic aid back on. There's no hard-line domestic faction pushing the Obama administration for tougher sanctions (as there is on Iran). But the Japanese government will look extremely unfavorably on rewarding North Korean provocations, and the White House will weigh that reality with care.

If officials in the U.S. and North Korean governments decide to push the current conflict further, we'll see an active restart of the nuclear program and provocative border incidents -- disruption of neighboring shipping and potentially a limited incursion into the demilitarized zone (DMZ). We could even begin to see some market impact in South Korea.

For now, North Korea appears determined to push the envelope. The United States can't give Pyongyang what it wants. All that's left is for the two sides to negotiate their way back to the negotiating table. That may take time, and the problem is growing that, in the interim, neither side has total control of where the conflict might go next.