Today, we turn to risk #5 in our series of posts on Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2012 and answer the most common questions we've gotten about it.

Here's a summary:

North Korea: Implosion or explosion? North Korea recently became the world's first nuclear-­armed power without a clear leader, and competition and uncertainty within the ruling elite pose significant risks for East Asia in 2012. The secretive nature of the regime makes the likeliest threat -- belligerent military action or substantial domestic instability -- less predictable and much more worrisome.

Q- Is Kim Jong-Un really in charge in North Korea?

A- There's always been a clear limit on what outsiders know about how the North Korean elite makes decisions. That's still the case. But there are plenty of reasons to doubt that this political novice is fully in charge. He hasn't had much time to prepare for his new job. His grandfather Kim Il-sung brought his father, Kim Jong-Il, gradually into power over more than 20 years. Kim Jong-Il inherited the keys to the kingdom in 1994 at the age of 53. The preparation of 28-year-old Kim Jong-Un began only recently as it became apparent that Kim Jong-Il's health was failing.

For the moment, the regime appears stable. Kim Jong-­Il's family and entourage -- the so-­called guardians --look to have firm control of the ruling Korean Workers' Party and the Korean People's Army. The country's military continues to serve as guarantor of North Korea's baseline security. In the two years before his death, Kim Jong­-Il positioned his brother­-in-­law and the regime's previous number two, Jang Sung-­Taek, as regent for his son. Jang is believed to have strong personal ties with senior military officials, and he'll probably hold considerable power -- at least until Kim Jung-­Un can earn the confidence of the country's ruling elite. If Kim can't consolidate power, the guardians may push for another leader to ensure the survival of the regime. But for the moment, it's probably some combination of Kim Jong-Un's status, Jang Sung-­Taek's resourcefulness, and the military's authority that gives the regime whatever cohesion it now has.

Q- Why can't this arrangement last indefinitely?

A- The steady deterioration of North Korea's economy and infrastructure over several decades, particularly outside the capital, ensures that this new generation of leaders will have less political capital and a less sure popular mandate than their predecessors. Conflicts are likely to develop within the elite as rivals and factions compete behind the scenes for power and personal survival. There is evidence that, once he knew he was ill, Kim Jong-­Il tried to sideline as many as possible of his son's potential rivals. In fact, there were a suspicious number of fatal automobile accidents involving senior officials over the past two years -- all the more striking given how little traffic there is in the country. Some officials still in power probably wonder how long they can remain in favor and could move to protect themselves. It's also unclear what role Kim Kyung-­Hee, Kim Jong-­Il's sister and Jang Sung-­Taek's wife, might play in coming months.

Q- It seems clear that there's a threat of aggressive action from North Korea, since they've stirred up trouble many times before. There's also always the risk that the government will collapse. That could create a refugee crisis and a scramble for control of the country's nuclear weapons that draws in outside powers. But beyond 2012, what's the long-term risk for North Korea and its neighbors?

A- The DPRK has defied predictions of collapse for decades, mainly because China and South Korea have always been willing to bail the country out to avoid another war on the peninsula and to prevent North Koreans from starving. Yes, there is the risk that North Korea might use its nuclear capability. Even if it doesn't, its conventional arms are powerful enough to launch a horrendous attack on the South. This is also the scenario most likely to put U.S. and Chinese forces at odds with another and in the same arena.

But the longer-term problem is that, despite the efforts of outsiders to keep things going, North Korea will one day buckle beneath the weight of its contradictions, and an international debate will begin about who will pay to clean up the mess. Studies conducted over the years suggest that the reunification of North and South Korea will prove more complicated and far more expensive than the reunion of East and West Germany. Who will pay for it? Imagine the stresses on South Korea and its economy as 20 million North Koreans come in from the cold. Today this is hypothetical, but one day it will be a very real problem.

One of the most important lessons of last year's Arab world turmoil is that brittle authoritarian regimes can remain in place for a very long time with changes ongoing beneath the ice that outsiders don't see until cracks emerge. Anyone could have predicted that the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria were vulnerable, but no one could have seen that the desperate act of one Tunisian vegetable vendor broadcast across the Arab world would trigger a wave of revolutions.

Given North Korea's isolation and the regime's secrecy, the fall of North Korea might come even more abruptly.

Next up, dark clouds over Pakistan.

By Ian Bremmer and David Gordon

Following the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and the shelling of a South Korean island in 2010, more North Korean provocations are almost certain in 2011. The likeliest steps include a third nuclear test, a long-range missile test, conventional attacks, or terrorism. With the United States and China often at cross purposes on this problem, this low-likelihood, high-impact risk in definitely one to keep an eye on.

The North's belligerence and its willingness to inflict casualties to make its point is almost certainly the result of a faster-than-expected leadership transition in Pyongyang. That's the only variable that could explain the sudden dramatic change in behavior of the past several months. The aggressiveness could be coming from external concerns -- that Kim Jong-Il's third son, Kim Jong-un, will be vulnerable to international "testing" if Pyongyang doesn't first prove his mettle. Or it could be internal -- if Kim Jong-Il fears the military isn't sold on his son's accession, especially in the event that the father dies suddenly. The latter scenario is much more troubling in terms of North Korea's willingness to provoke military conflict on the peninsula, but there's no way of knowing which of the two is the more likely. Beijing's view is that it's unwise to take any steps that would roil the North Koreans while a change of regime is in the offing. And change inside North Korea certainly appears to be underway.

Meanwhile, the South Korean political landscape is among the most polarized in Asia, and the hard liners are -- at least for the coming year --pulling the strings. President Lee Myung-bak has no desire to provoke war, but he's also politically disposed to take measures that Pyongyang will view as overtly hostile, steps like creation of a reunification tax that plans for an eventual North Korean collapse and more military exercises inside what North Korea considers to be contested territory. And some within the South Korean military may want to prove that their country is not the North's punching bag.

A response to North Korean escalation will likely be designed to avoid any appearance of escalation, unless Pyongyang directly targets peninsular South Korea or U.S. forces. The North threatened both in a recent statement.

The biggest risk here will materialize only if the North Korean transition begins to fail and regime collapse looms imminent. In this case, the United States and China would find themselves with sharply different priorities, as the U.S. military looks to ensure security of the North's nuclear arsenal while the Chinese look to prevent a flood of sick and starving North Korean refugees into China. There's been no military-to-military discussion, let alone coordination, for scenario planning between the United States and Chinese leadership. That's not the best recipe for crisis management.

On Wednesday, we'll move toward a more macro theme: capital controls, which takes its place at no. 6 on our list of 2011's top risks.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group. David Gordon is the firm's head of research.

There appears to be an awful lot of turmoil inside North Korea at the moment. Rumors that Kim Jong Il is dying just won't die. The North Korean sinking of the South Korea naval vessel Cheonan has ratcheted up regional tensions to genuinely alarming heights. Botched backpedalling on economic reforms inside North Korea a few months ago forced a rare government apology to the North Korean people, and the country's Finance Minister was executed. A former Railway Minister was executed in March 2009 after workers stole and sold parts of locomotives. Just this week, according to South Korean reports, a former chief delegate to talks with South Korea was killed by firing squad.

Whenever there's an unusual amount of upheaval inside North Korea, the question arises again: Does Kim Jong Il really call all the shots in the DPRK -- including on decisions of war and peace? Even within a regime built atop an extreme form of cult of personality, can one man really be fully in charge?

In Kim's case, no one outside the North Korean elite knows for sure. But I can say from firsthand experience that sometimes there really is just one man behind the curtain.

In 1998, as Eurasia Group organized an event with the Turkmen delegation to the UN General Assembly, I found myself in the middle of a diplomatic dust-up involving then-President Bill Clinton and Turkmenistan's President Saparmurat Niyazov, aka Turkmenbashi, the "Father of All Turkmen."

This is a man who ordered construction in the center of Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan's capital, of a triumphal, three-pronged arch, combined with a 220-foot victory column, that served as pedestal for a massive, pure-gold statue of himself, rotating a full 360 degrees every 24 hours. This is the author of Ruhnama, "the answer to all questions," a text meant to replace the Koran as his people's principal source of wisdom and spiritual sustenance. This is the guy who renamed days of the week and months of the year after himself and his family.

Kim has his wacky side, but he's got nothing on the father of All Turkmen.

Just before Niyazov was to hold talks with Clinton for the first (and only) time, his government announced the arrest of an exiled former foreign minister. The former ally-turned critic saw the meeting with Clinton as an opportunity to return to his country and stir up trouble as the world was watching. Turkmenbashi was having none of it. Frightened that the arrest would scuttle the talks before they had begun, I watched as cabinet officials, military brass and even family members took turns trying to convince Niyazov to play it cool. Some even managed to broach the subject. Niyazov was unmoved.

The impasse was finally resolved, but not until Turkmenbashi had proven beyond all doubt that only he made high-level decisions in Turkmenistan. His control, exerted through a combination of patronage and terror, was astonishing. The president for life died in December 2006, and his statue is about to be retired, but his legacy in Turkmenistan will prove harder to dismantle.

That's why we should give credence to stories from Russian diplomats that no one in Iraq ever gave Saddam Hussein bad news. And that's why it's not impossible that war and peace on the Korean peninsula might one day depend on a decision made by Kim Jong Il. Within an extreme authoritarian regime, very, very few officials have access to the information that might inform key decisions. That's part of why these brittle regimes eventually fall with a bang. See Ceausescu, Nicolae.

But North Korea is not Turkmenistan, Iraq, or Romania. It is home to one of the world's largest militaries. It has nuclear weapons. It can export significant numbers of sick and starving refugees, and its implosion would pose a reunification challenge that dwarfs the costs faced in Germany.

That's why North Korea is a problem we can never afford to ignore.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? 

By Ian Bremmer

The international conflict over North Korea's nuclear program has been locked in stalemate for years. The United States and Japan fear that Pyongyang will sell nuclear weapons and material to rogue regimes and/or terrorist groups or stumble its way into a shooting war. China and South Korea worry that North Korea will collapse, flooding Chinese border regions with sick and starving refugees and leaving South Korea with a reunification project that will cost a fortune and last a generation. This problem has allowed Kim Jong Il to periodically saber-rattle his way into fresh supplies of cash, food, and fuel. It's all been entirely predictable.

But the Dear Leader's illness has changed the game. His government has been unusually belligerent lately, even by North Korean standards. Following the latest missile tests, they haven't made new demands for talks or aid and insist they will not return to six-party talks until others at the table accept North Korea as a nuclear state. Its government has since sentenced two US journalists to 12 years of hard labor for "hostilities against the Korean nation and illegal entry." Especially provocative have been a series of cyber-attacks on US and South Korean government websites, which officials in both countries believe originated from North Korea. This more reckless North Korean behavior suggests that senior civilian and military officials, increasingly unsure how the coming power transition will go, are trying to secure some extra room for maneuver.

For the moment, North Korean actions are aimed at an internal, not an international, audience. That makes their actions less predictable -- and increases the risk of accidental confrontation.

The Obama administration, aware that bad things happen when all sides are in escalation mode at the same time, has stepped back from the tougher rhetoric of weeks past. There's been little mention of sanctions. For the imprisoned journalists, Secretary of State Clinton is now asking for mercy rather than demanding justice.

But if North Korea really is moving into political succession mode as Kim Jong Il's health heads downhill, those who will be left behind are making a much-faster-than-planned move to shore up support for his recently designated successor, third son Kim Jong Un. It will be easier for them to maintain national unity at a time when the country stands on the brink of war.

Until the North Korean leadership feels confident enough to return to the established patterns of negotiation and extortion, its actions will remain much more difficult to predict. That problem, in turns, elevates the risk of miscalculation -- and a confrontation that no one wants.

AUM JUNG-SEOK/AFP/Getty Images