By Damien Ma

In the midst of strident declarations that the global nuclear renaissance is over, it is worth pointing out that in China at least, the rebirth of nuclear power is for all intents and purposes a done deal, especially now that Japan's nuclear crisis seems to have turned a corner. Many thought Beijing's immediate announcement of a safety review and a freeze on new approvals meant the industry was effectively on life support. But that's not true. Nuclear power features prominently in the 12th Five-Year Plan (FYP) as an essential base-load alternative to coal. And because there are no easy substitutes, nuclear power is a key part of achieving China's clean energy goals.

The recently ratified 12th FYP contains binding targets to have non-fossil fuels account for 11.4 percent of China's primary energy mix and for a carbon intensity reduction of 17 percent by 2015. Those goals are likely to be reached only by meaningfully expanding nuclear power because renewables alone (including hydro) are unlikely to be sufficient in offsetting coal and meeting the plan's objective. Nuclear capacity is expected to quadruple from the current 10.8GW to around 40GW by 2015. The State Council has reportedly already approved 34 plants totaling 36.9GW, with work on 25 of those projects (totaling 27.7GW) having already started. Even if the new regulatory review delays construction of the remaining nine projects on the drawing board, China's nuclear power capacity would eventually still be just shy of 40GW.

The review process will have some effect though. Yet-to-be approved projects may be shelved. Existing projects and those yet to break ground could temporarily see delays or receive more scrutiny to determine whether they need to be retrofitted. But decommissioning reactors seems unlikely. China's fleet of reactors is relatively young, compare to the 40-year-old ones in Fukushima. Siting future plants in interior China, such as in Chongqing and Hunan, may also be reconsidered because of their proximity to notable quake zones. It is also worth noting that though China stated in 2010 that it is aiming for 70GW-86GW of installed capacity by 2020 (with some proposing total capacity as high as 100GW), that figure could ultimately err on the conservative side once Beijing reassesses its energy needs for the 13th FYP. But even at 70GW, China would be one of the largest nuclear markets in the world.

The support for nuclear energy reflects the political strength of its champions in the Chinese government. Top energy officials, such as former National Energy Administration (NEA) head Zhang Guobao and current NEA chief Liu Tienan, have publicly stated in recent days that China needs to develop its nuclear industry, with safety as a prerequisite. Other officials from the environment ministry, which has a hand in managing the nuclear sector, have also argued that China needs nuclear power to ensure energy security amid growing demand. Indeed, energy security and clean development have been invoked as compelling arguments. The head of the China National Nuclear Corp., one of the country's two nuclear giants, recently pointed to data indicating that China's existing nuclear capacity reduced annual emissions (67 million tons less of CO2 and 250,000 tons less of SO2) compared to equivalent coal-fired capacity.

Yet the effusive support elides legitimate concerns about whether China can produce a sufficient number of properly trained operators and managers that can keep up with the expansion of plants. (The Chinese obviously would prefer technicians like those handling the Fukushima crisis.) And the Japanese crisis has lent ammunition to some critics of the pace and scope of China's nuclear pursuit, with some likening it to a "great leap forward." The episode could perhaps inspire a more open debate about China's nuclear trajectory. It is also possible that bottom-up populism, particularly in a more "progressive" province such as Guangdong, could fight local governments over future plant sites. But ultimately, a sudden reversal of the civilian nuclear program that began in earnest 20 years ago seems unlikely.

Damien Ma is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Asia practice.

By Ian Bremmer and David Gordon

Individual hackers and organized crime organizations have targeted businesses for years, but cyberattacks have rarely created political risk. They do now. The centralization of data networks -- both in energy distribution (the move to the smart grid) and information technology more broadly (the shift to cloud computing) -- is increasing the vulnerability of states to potentially debilitating cyberattacks. As governments become more directly and actively involved in cyberspace, geopolitics and cybersecurity will collide in three major ways.

First, new cyber capacity allows governments to project power in a world where direct military strikes are much more costly and dangerous. There have been plenty of stories about well-funded efforts from inside China to manipulate access to the Internet, but it's the almost-certainly state-sponsored Stuxnet attacks on Iran's industrial infrastructure that provide the clearest early glimpse of what tomorrow's carefully targeted state-sponsored attack might look like. When a missile is launched, everyone knows where it came from. Cyberattacks are a very different story.

Second, we'll see more cyber conflicts between state-owned companies and multinational corporations, providing state capitalists with tools that give them a competitive commercial advantage. China and Chinese companies are by far the biggest concern here. Throw in Beijing's indigenous innovation plans, which are designed to ensure that China develops its own advanced technology, and this is probably the world's most important source of direct conflict between states and corporations.

Third, there is the increasing fallout from the WikiLeaks problem, as those sympathetic to Julian Assange unleash attacks on governments and the corporations that support them in targeting WikiLeaks and its founder. In fact, the principal cybersecurity concern of governments has shifted from potential attacks by al Qaeda or Chinese security forces to radicalized info -- anarchists undertaking a debilitating attack against critical infrastructure, a key government agency, or a pillar of the financial system. Whether attacks are waged for power (state versus state), profit (particularly among state capitalists), or for 'the people,' (as in the WikiLeaks case), this will be a wildcard to watch in 2011.

On Friday, we'll talk about Top Risk no. 4: China -- and why its policymakers will frustrate much of the international community this year.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group. David Gordon is the firm's head of research.

By Willis Sparks and Geoff Porter

As the world focuses on the diplomatic tug of war over Iran's nuclear program, Israel lives with the worrying hum of all those centrifuges spinning just a thousand miles to the east. Yet, Benjamin Netanyahu's government knows that if Israel launches airstrikes, there's a limit to how much damage can be done and how long Iran's progress can be delayed. It therefore has to persuade the Obama administration -- and anyone else who might help slow Iran's march -- to see the risks from Iran as Israel sees them.

It helped that Iran recently revealed the existence of an undeclared nuclear site near the city of Qom. At the very least, that revelation of Iranian dishonesty might have made it a little more difficult for Beijing and Moscow to justify continued resistance to sanctions. Yet, Israel remained quiet. Suddenly it appeared Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and National Security Advisor Uzi Arad might have a wind at their backs. Though they'd like the wind to blow a bit more steadily and to get them to their destination quicker, they can't risk the rhetoric that might label them as blowhards.

But now there's talk of a diplomatic breakthrough. Following talks in Geneva with negotiators from the United States, China, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany, Iran has signed on to a tentative "interim agreement" to accept a U.S.-Russian proposal (that has been on the table for more than a year) to ship much of its low enriched uranium outside the country for reprocessing. Ensuring that this uranium is processed outside the country would help verify that it's used for civilian, not military, purposes. And then over the weekend, Iran ostensibly agreed to allow IAEA inspectors into the Qom facility on Oct. 25.

This leaves the Israeli government in a bind. First, because the details have yet to be worked out and Iran could renounce a completed agreement at any time, Israel can't take much comfort from it. Second, the fact that others treat it as a potential diplomatic breakthrough makes it even less likely than before that Israel could justify military strikes or that the US can persuade Russia and (especially) China to support sanctions tough enough to make any difference in Iran's strategic planning.

Israel has no faith that the potential for diplomatic détente between Iran and the US and EU is anything more than an Iranian stalling tactic, buying Tehran more time to speed toward the nuclear finish line. Likewise, Israel doesn't believe that sanctions -- no matter how tough they are -- will back Iran down. For Israel, diplomacy and sanctions are merely different forms of delay, but Netanyahu has little choice but to wait them out.

He'll be waiting for some time. First, diplomacy has to run its course. Following the tentative agreement in Geneva and the announcement that Iran will allow inspection of its Qom facility, the diplomatic track seems to be gaining momentum. Once that momentum slows and stalemate resumes, sanctions will be debated and some of them will be implemented. That won't happen before spring 2010 at the earliest.

In the meantime, Israel has little choice but to sit on its hands. Netanyahu knows that strikes on Iran's nuclear sites during delicate negotiations would inflict much more damage to Israel's international reputation -- and its relations with Washington, in particular -- than to Iran's nuclear program. Nothing brings this home more clearly than the U.N. Human Rights Council's report investigating Israel's military campaign in the Gaza Strip in 2008-09, which came very close to launching a legal process within the UN that could have produced a referral to the U.N. Security Council -- and possibly a war crimes tribunal. That's not going to happen, but it underscored already shifting international attitudes toward Israel.

Former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has said 2010 would be the year of sanctions. His government was hoping for a year of action. Instead, Israel will wait.

Willis Sparks is Global Macro Analyst and Geoff Porter is Middle East & Africa Director at Eurasia Group. 

Alex Wong/Getty Images