Vladimir Putin isn't just the second most powerful person in the world. As this FP Slide Show makes clear, the Russian leader is also a race-car driver and a blackbelt in judo.

By Ian Bremmer

A few days ago, I took a quick, informal survey around Eurasia Group on power and global politics. The question: Who are the world's most powerful people? We're defining power as "a measure of an individual's ability to (singlehandedly) bring about change that significantly affects the lives and fortunes of large numbers of people."

Here's what we came up with:

1. Nobody -- In a G-Zero world, everyone is waiting for someone else to shoulder responsibility for the world's toughest and most dangerous challenges. The leaders you'll see named further down this list are preoccupied with local and regional problems and don't have the interest and leverage needed to take on a growing list of transnational problems.

2. Vladimir Putin -- In Russia's personalized system, this is still the person who counts. He isn't as popular as he used to be, and his country has no Soviet-scale clout or influence, but no one on the planet has consolidated more domestic and regional power than Putin.

3. Ben Bernanke -- The world's largest economy is still struggling to find its footing. To help, no one has more levers to pull and buttons to push. The world needs the U.S. economy back on its feet, and Bernanke has more direct influence than anyone else on when and how that happens.

4. Angela Merkel -- For the moment, her commitments are the glue that binds Europe. Merkel's ability to bankroll Europe's emergency funds, win concessions from the governments of cash-strapped peripherals, and maintain solid popularity at home continues to be a remarkable political and policy achievement.

5. Barack Obama -- Even at a time when Washington is focused almost entirely on Washington, the elected leader of the world's most powerful and influential country carries a lot of water. The Obama administration will watch the eurozone from the sidelines and keep commitments in the Middle East to a minimum, but America will continue to broaden and deepen security and commercial relationships in East Asia, and Obama's decisions on how far and how fast to move will be crucial.

6. Mario Draghi -- Europe's backstop. Europe's Central Bank has kept the continent's blood flowing at a crucial moment in its history, and his work is far from done.

7. Xi Jinping -- China's forward progress is the world's most important variable, and Xi Jinping is now the man behind the wheel. Over the next decade, economic and political reforms will be needed to keep China on track, and Xi will make some difficult (and profoundly important) decisions.

8 (tie). Ayatollah Khamenei -- The supreme spiritual and political authority in a country at the heart of a volatile region. Halfway through 2013, Ahmadinejad will give way to a new president, but it is still Khamenei who will decide how the international fight over Iran's nuclear program plays out -- and what the future holds for the Islamic Republic.

8 (tie). Christine Lagarde -- The world's fire marshal. Here is that rare leader whose contribution will be crucial in multiple regions at once. But nowhere will the IMF's work be more important than in keeping Europe on track.

10. King Abdullah Bin Abd al-Aziz -- King of a kingdom with a unique power to move markets. The Saudi monarch is not in the best of health, but the choices he makes in determining who lead the world's hydrocarbon powerhouse into the next generation will help shape the entire global economy for many years to come.

What do you think?

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group.

By Ayham Kamel and Willis Sparks

When a Tunisian vegetable vendor's act of suicidal despair ignited fury and demands for change across the Arab world last year, the rulers of Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest and most influential of Arab states, went on high alert. Saudis have grown used to trouble across their southern border in Yemen, and when protests swelled in tiny Bahrain last spring, Saudi troops moved quickly across the 16-mile-long King Fahd Causeway to save Bahrain's ruling family from angry Shia protesters. These exceptions aside, the oil-rich Persian Gulf monarchies have so far avoided the worst of the region's unrest.

There are signs that may change. In Kuwait -- a member of OPEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council, home to 3.6 million people, and a base for thousands of U.S. troops -- a long-simmering conflict between an opposition-led parliament and the ruling Al Sabah family has reduced Kuwaiti politics to an increasingly bitter stalemate.

The government, led by Emir Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, appoints the prime minister and claims the final word on policy. Reform-minded opposition leaders now say a majority of the 50 members of parliament should be able to appoint the prime minister and that appointees should answer for their performance to elected legislators. Public protests, fueled by uprisings in other Arab countries, have upped the stakes in the battle for control of policy, and in recent months, things have gotten much hotter.

In November, demonstrators stormed parliament and forced the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed al-Sabah, the emir's nephew. In December, the emir responded by dissolving parliament. In February, new elections were held and, much to the ruling family's dismay, the Islamist-led opposition won a majority of seats.

In the last few months, opposition leaders have summoned several ministers to answer corruption and mismanagement charges. While the emir did not respond by dissolving parliament, the country's constitutional court then entered the fray by annulling the results of the February elections and ordering reinstatement of the previous (less confrontational) legislature. Kuwait's cabinet resigned on Monday. The emir will probably call for new elections to avoid a confrontation with opposition groups, but public tolerance for this pattern of confrontation and reformation is now more limited.

It's unclear what happens next, but in months to come, Kuwait may be headed for the kind of trouble that its fellow oil-producing Gulf neighbors have worked hard to avoid.

The most obvious risk to Kuwait's stability could come from within the country's ruling family. By tradition, the post of emir is meant to pass back and forth between the family's Al Jaber and Al Salem branches. But with the death of the previous emir, an Al Jaber, in January 2006 following a nearly 30-year reign, a member of the Al Salem branch held the post for just nine days. The current emir, another Al Jaber, elbowed him aside. He is now 83 years old, and there is no clear plan for succession. When he dies, the Al Salems will probably become more assertive to ensure that their branch of the family is not reduced to permanent second-class status within the ruling elite. The Al Jabers will push back.

In addition, as in Saudi Arabia, some within the family worry that the current ruler has moved too quickly on reform, and there is a generation of younger royals who are already competing against one another for access, influence, and power. With every hint that a formal transfer of authority will soon begin, behind-the-scenes fighting will intensify as dozens of power players move to protect and enhance their positions. The resulting conflict could spill into the open -- and at a moment when determined opposition politicians and an increasingly restive public are ready to test their leadership.

Kuwaiti security forces can handle moderate levels of unrest. They've done it before. But an unexpected surge of demonstrations in a moment of divided leadership could provide them an unprecedented test.

That, in turn, could spook investors already worried about the impact of potential Middle East turmoil on the region's oil supplies. It could also bring higher levels of public anger into other Gulf states -- maybe even into Saudi Arabia. Kuwait is not Syria or Libya or even Egypt. It is a wealthy country unused to large-scale public unrest. But like regional heavyweights Saudi Arabia and Iran, Kuwait is an authoritarian country facing the medium-term prospect of generational change within the leadership in a volatile historical moment for the region.

That's why it will certainly bear watching in months to come.

Ayham Kamel is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Middle East and North Africa practice. Willis Sparks is an analyst in the firm's Global Macro practice.

By Ayham Kamel

The recent failure of Saudi King Abdullah's proposal to turn the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) into a confederation of states illustrates Riyadh's recurring inability to integrate Gulf nations into a counterweight against Iran. As wary as the Gulf states are about Iran's influence, they aren't ready to turn any of their independence over to Riyadh. It looks increasingly likely, however, that Saudi Arabia and Bahrain will establish a mini-confederation of Sunni-ruled states, an alliance that is sure to make Shia Iran uneasy. Heightened sectarian tension and the Gulf states' continued reliance on the US security umbrella will, in turn, make it difficult for the US and other Western powers to disengage from the region.

Abdullah had originally proposed a political union for the GCC, but stepped back in response to negative reactions from fellow Gulf states. Saudi Arabia then pushed for a less ambitious confederation at last week's GCC summit in Riyadh, but even that was anathema to other Gulf states. Both in private and public meetings, GCC leaders had expressed deep reservations about an immediate and broader process of creating a political union. This led Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Saud al Faisal, to clarify that the new framework for integration would preserve sovereignty over domestic issues. Still, there was no traction.

Riyadh and Tehran could not espouse more different ideals, but Gulf states fear Saudi Arabia's Sunni dominance as much as Iran's power. The rulers of Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman have built the foundations of their polities on the principle of remaining independent from Riyadh. In the past 40 years, they sought to reinforce their independence by developing security pacts with Western powers and pursuing policies that distinguish them from Saudi Arabia. Even Kuwait's Emir Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad al Sabah, the father of the GCC proposal in the 1980's, is not particularly enthusiastic about the trajectory of Saudi Arabia's union plan. The Arab Spring and shared perception of Iran's aggressive intent are creating a new environment, but common fears will probably not translate into the creation of a common polity.

In the meantime, it is increasingly likely that Saudi Arabia and Bahrain will establish a mini-confederation. While formally labeled as a GCC union, there are few indications that other states are currently interested in joining under the new structure. Riyadh has long contemplated a union with the al Khalifa regime as a means to resolving the perceived problem of Bahrain's Shia majority. Saudi Arabia continues to believe that Bahrain represents a strategic challenge to the kingdom, and a collapse of the al Khalifa ruling family could prompt an uprising in Saudi Arabia's oil rich Eastern Province where the Shia population is believed to represent a solid majority. There is an emerging realization in the palaces of the al Saud that Bahrain's political challenges are here to stay and that a proactive policy to contain threats from the small gulf island is more of a necessity than a choice.

Last year's uprising in Bahrain prompted Saudi Arabia to reassess its strategy. Despite the Bahrain regime's uncompromising stance with the Shia population, Saudi Arabia still worries about the long-term stability of its Sunni allies. These worries are reinforced by Saudi suspicion of active Iranian interference in Bahrain. Last month's visit by Iran's president to Abu Musa, the first by a head of state to an island claimed by both Iran and the UAE, increased Saudi fears of Iran's disruptive role in the region. Riyadh probably believes that visit signals Iran's willingness to infringe on the internal affairs of Gulf countries and that Tehran could once again claim that Bahrain is part of its historical territories.

A Saudi Arabia-Bahrain confederation would do little more than formalize Riyadh's leverage in Bahrain's affairs. Most importantly, a confederation would almost definitively put an end to prospects of a negotiated compromise with Bahrain's Shia population. Iran would consider the mini-confederation as Saudi Arabia's de facto annexation of Bahrain, and would feel that it needs to be more proactive in confronting Sunni monarchies in the Gulf. Meanwhile, the failure of the broader confederation means that other Gulf states must continue to rely on the US security umbrella. None of this fits nicely with US aspirations to extricate itself from the region, or with hopes for a calmer oil market.

Ayham Kamel is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Middle East and North Africa practice.

By Ayham Kamel

In a much publicized television appearance on Aug. 8, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia withdrew his country's support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, where the government has been beating back protesters for the last five months. The spilling of innocent blood was "against values and ethics," the king said. The Saudi ambassador in Damascus was recalled the same day, prompting similar steps by Kuwait and Bahrain. The developments came in response to Syria's military operations in the Sunni strongholds of Hama and Deir al Zour -- events that rankled the Saudi leadership.

Nevertheless, the militarization of the protest movement over the last few weeks has made Damascus even more assertive and less tolerant of dissent. As such, the situation in Syria is exacerbating Sunni-Shia tensions and raising the likelihood of conflict in all multi-sectarian nations in the region. And while the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states' moves will not inhibit the regime's heavy handed strategy -- more than a dozen protestors were killed on Wednesday -- they presage Syria's emergence as the nexus of a regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Heightened pressure on the Syrian regime will not lead to the immediate collapse of Assad's regime, but it will chip away at his power. The policy shift will leave Damascus more isolated and may lead Syria's political and economic elite, particularly Sunnis, to reconsider their allegiance to Assad. The GCC countries' change of heart likely also precedes a coordinated international upsurge of diplomatic and economic pressure. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has already signaled a firmer U.S. stance toward the regime, and new U.S. and European sanctions are expected in the next few weeks. Today, in fact, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on the commercial bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based subsidiary, as well as Syriatel, the country's largest mobile phone operator. These moves, like those of the Arab states, seek to nudge the middle classes in Aleppo and Damascus, which so far have not joined the ranks of the demonstrators en masse. But the Syrian regime remains unlikely to rethink its strategy. The country's military and security establishments are firmly committed to confronting the protesters aggressively, arguing that any other approach would strengthen the opposition. 

Saudi leaders, meanwhile, are still on the fence about what the kingdom's Syria policy should be. They know that a political transition would be problematic and could spark a regional confrontation, which is why the king's speech, while criticizing the Syrian regime, also called on Assad to be courageous and introduce reforms. If Syrian policy remains unchanged over the next few weeks, however, the kingdom's position will likely shift toward outright opposition. Iran, in contrast, feels threatened by the potential loss of the Assad regime and of Iran's strategic depth on the shore of the Mediterranean, and has therefore reinforced its support of the Syrian government.

These opposing moves by Riyadh and Tehran suggest that Syria will become the focal point of Iran and Saudi Arabia's regional tussle for power. Indeed, many in Riyadh are beginning to perceive the upheaval as an opportunity to contain Iranian influence in the Middle East. In the meantime, all eyes are on Ankara to see if Turkey's leaders will be able to convince Assad to accelerate his reform program and resolve the crisis.  

Ayham Kamel is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Middle East practice group.

By Hani Sabra and Willis Sparks

Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah continues his recovery from surgery in New York's Presbyterian Hospital -- though he's probably resting a bit less comfortably following revelations from Wikileaks that he urged the U.S. government to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. There's no reason to doubt that the monarch can head home soon. But given his age -- he's believed to be 86 -- it's inevitable that members of his (very large) family will spend a bit more time in coming weeks thinking about the future. Outsiders are thinking about it too, given the kingdom's role as a regional powerbroker and the world's leading producer of crude oil.

There's plenty to think about, because Saudi succession politics will soon become much more complicated. In most monarchies, including states like Morocco and Jordan, power is passed from king to son. In Saudi Arabia, it's passed from king to brother. The crown moves from one generation to the next only when no viable same-generation brothers remain. As the current generation of Saudi leadership ages, the kingdom will likely soon undergo just such a generational change.

The current generation has a few remaining contenders. First in line, Crown Prince Sultan, 84, spent most of 2009 recovering from surgery in Morocco -- and he returned there for an "extended vacation" in August, before heading home as a precaution when King Abdullah went into surgery.

Next is the conservative Interior Minister Prince Nayef, 77, who was named second deputy Prime Minister in 2009, a position that makes him Crown Prince in waiting. But Nayef has also had health problems. Then there is Riyadh's powerful governor, Prince Salman, who acts as a kind of royal mediator, helping to settle high-level disputes safely behind closed doors. He's well-liked, but he's also in his seventies and had back surgery earlier this year.  

Not surprisingly, the third generation of al Sauds are already jockeying for position. King Abdullah's sons hold prominent positions. Prince Meteb is director of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Prince Abdelaziz is an advisor to the King and has lately taken on some high-level diplomatic missions. Crown Prince Sultan's son, Prince Khaled, serves as deputy defense minister and has raised his profile by leading Saudi Arabia's military engagement with Yemen. Interior Minister Prince Nayef's son, Prince Mohamed, is deputy interior minister and has survived an al Qaeda assassination attempt, burnishing his image as a battler against militants bent on sowing destruction in the kingdom.

Each of these men has developed his own power base. And while the current generation of Saudi princes has generally favored stability over infighting, the process of succession for the next generation is not so clear. Soon after becoming king in 2006, Abdullah established a body called the Allegiance Council to ensure consensus in the royal succession process and to balance the competing branches of the royal family. But the council's powers remain informal at best and vague at worst. And there's no guarantee that a future king won't simply ignore or even disband it.  

A third generation king will not likely bring dramatic change to Saudi Arabia. After all, the status quo has been very good to the Saudi royals. But the fight over succession could allow private feuds to spill into the open, an ugly side of Saudi politics that those outside the elite almost never see.

That might one day throw the stability of the ruling family itself into question.

Hani Sabra is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Middle East practice. Willis Sparks is an analyst in the firm's Global Macro practice.

By Hani Sabra and Willis Sparks

The friction between the United Arab Emirates and Research in Motion (RIM), isn't new. Since at least 2007, security officials in the UAE have complained that the Canada-based company that makes BlackBerry devices uses encryption technology that makes it impossible to monitor the content of BlackBerry-generated messages within the country -- creating opportunities for spies, terrorists, and other anti-government militants to communicate within the emirates without fear of detection. RIM exports its data offshore, denying authorities access to its systems.

Last weekend, the UAE announced that on October 11 it would suspend BlackBerry services to the country's subscribers and visitors. A few hours later, Saudi officials followed suit. Emirati authorities say that unless RIM lifts the veil on its messaging encryption, allowing security officials to track threats to national security, there will be no service inside the country. Beyond perceived threats from Iran, al Qaeda-related groups, or other militants, Abu Dhabi would like to avoid any repeat of the embarrassment that followed the assassination of a Hamas leader in Dubai in January, an attack that Emirati officials blame on Israel.

But the UAE will probably compromise with RIM before the deadline. The emirates have real security concerns, but they also want to build on their role as the Arab world's primary commercial and tourism hub. There are half a million BlackBerry users in the UAE, about ten percent of the total population, and blocking BlackBerry is bad for business. The UAE announced the ban to signal RIM that it's serious about security, but it gave a ten-week heads-up to allow time for a workable compromise.

The UAE will probably do most of the compromising, since RIM, which operates in more than 170 countries, won't live or die based on access to the Emirates. The UAE simply doesn't represent a large enough piece of RIM's business to persuade the company to set a precedent which other governments will insist on following. RIM can make modest concessions without altering the company's security model, and that's probably what it will do.

It's also possible, though much less likely, that several other countries will follow the UAE's lead, forcing RIM to either fundamentally alter its security model or surrender access to some especially lucrative markets.

The Saudis, who say they will flip the switch later this month, will face much less pressure to compromise. Saudi Arabia remains an oil-based economy, and its leaders have no ambition to compete with the UAE for the chance to host more corporate or financial leaders -- or foreign tourists. And though its population is four times larger than the UAE's, Saudi Arabia has fewer BlackBerry users. Closing the door on RIM will have little impact on the country's business and generate little if any domestic opposition.

But this is not simply a story of authoritarian governments and their drive for control. The world's leading democracies have their own communications-related security concerns. In July, India threatened to ban Blackberry use unless RIM provided Indian security officials with access to data transferred by its secured messaging system. RIM reportedly promised to work toward compromise, and talks continue.

And what would happen if militants coordinated a successful terrorist attack inside the United States using BlackBerry's encrypted technology? Remember the phrase "warrantless wiretapping?" If American media reported that the U.S. government had no access to the communications that terrorists use to kill Americans on U.S. soil, how fast would lawmakers of both parties rush to force open BlackBerry's coded communications?

There are many forms of government, but fear is universal. This is a conflict that political officials and technology companies will be fighting on many fronts and for many years to come.

Hani Sabra is an analyst in Eurasia Group’s Middle East practice.  Willis Sparks is an analyst in the firm’s Global Macro practice.