By Aditya Bhattacharji, Daniil Davydoff, and Scott Rosenstein

Attacks on U.S. interests in the Middle East are not the only security threats to have emerged from the region in recent weeks. In epidemiological circles, concern has been mounting over the discovery of a novel coronavirus in Saudi Arabia, just as Muslims from all over the world begin the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca at the end of October.

In the coming weeks, much-needed surveillance and scientific analysis will likely yield important details regarding this virus's threat to human health. But healthcare system shortfalls in some of the countries that dispatch the most pilgrims present obstacles to disease monitoring. And regardless of the microbe's eventual health, economic, and political impact, these deficits are a vivid reminder of institutional challenges to global disease prevention and control.

Little is known about the novel pathogen, but it does belong to the same family as the virus behind the 2003 SARS outbreak, a previously unknown microbe that killed nearly 800 people and sickened more than 8,000. SARS revealed the political and economic  risks attendant to emerging infectious diseases. But attention to these dangers has increased considerably since SARS, and this novel virus has thus far been confirmed in only two patients, one of whom is under intensive care at a hospital in London.

Whether it's a heretofore unknown virus, polio, or a host of other pathogens, the upcoming Hajj presents significant public health risks. The annual event attracts millions of pilgrims every year and is therefore an "ideal environment for spreading infectious diseases," according to the U.S. CDC. Although the Saudi government has mandated several vaccinations and dedicated considerable resources to lower infectious disease risks, its personnel cannot track pilgrims once they have left the country. And while the WHO has already issued basic case definitions for identifying infected patients, healthcare system deficiencies abroad could allow potential cases to slip through the cracks and go underreported.

Home to roughly 200 million Muslims, Indonesia is sending the world's largest contingent of hajj pilgrims (approximately 200,000). At home, the vast majority relies upon a decentralized healthcare system that suffers from poor information sharing and one of the most inadequately staffed healthcare workforces of any ASEAN nation. Those with means increasingly seek medical treatment abroad. The trend has become pronounced enough for Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to implore the public, in August 2012, to utilize domestic medical facilities, despite having availed of foreign medical care himself. Indonesia is ill-equipped to track diseases over a territory that spans 17,500 islands even under normal circumstances. There's been speculation that an individual returning home from the Hajj was responsible for the reintroduction of polio into Indonesia in 2004 (via a strain of the disease traceable back to northern Nigeria).

As the second-largest Muslim majority country, Pakistan's quota for pilgrims is more than 179,000, though only about 95,000 Pakistani Muslims plan to take part in the hajj. Even so, recent developments in the country's healthcare sector could impede epidemiological surveillance of returning pilgrims. In 2011, Pakistan devolved its health ministry, relegating previously centralized functions to a variety of provincial and federal-level institutions. Responsibilities for disease surveillance are now fragmented between multiple government agencies and power struggles are reportedly common. While Pakistan may eventually develop a more cohesive public health system, the current state of surveillance is worrisome in the run-up to the hajj.

Some smaller contributors of pilgrims, such as Syria, may also be ill-prepared to catch cases of infection. Current unrest in that country, which has produced considerable strain on the healthcare system, could severely slow down the detection of unusual disease symptoms.

Should pilgrims come home with an infection acquired during the pilgrimage, there may be little to stop the disease from going undetected and infecting others. Whether the newly discovered coronavirus turns into a significant public health threat or not, its emergence reveals the danger that exists when health services are compromised, but the evolution and spread of disease are not.

Scott Rosenstein is director and Aditya Bhattacharji and Daniil Davydoff are analysts in Eurasia Group's Global Health practice.

By Hani Sabra and Willis Sparks

The friction between the United Arab Emirates and Research in Motion (RIM), isn't new. Since at least 2007, security officials in the UAE have complained that the Canada-based company that makes BlackBerry devices uses encryption technology that makes it impossible to monitor the content of BlackBerry-generated messages within the country -- creating opportunities for spies, terrorists, and other anti-government militants to communicate within the emirates without fear of detection. RIM exports its data offshore, denying authorities access to its systems.

Last weekend, the UAE announced that on October 11 it would suspend BlackBerry services to the country's subscribers and visitors. A few hours later, Saudi officials followed suit. Emirati authorities say that unless RIM lifts the veil on its messaging encryption, allowing security officials to track threats to national security, there will be no service inside the country. Beyond perceived threats from Iran, al Qaeda-related groups, or other militants, Abu Dhabi would like to avoid any repeat of the embarrassment that followed the assassination of a Hamas leader in Dubai in January, an attack that Emirati officials blame on Israel.

But the UAE will probably compromise with RIM before the deadline. The emirates have real security concerns, but they also want to build on their role as the Arab world's primary commercial and tourism hub. There are half a million BlackBerry users in the UAE, about ten percent of the total population, and blocking BlackBerry is bad for business. The UAE announced the ban to signal RIM that it's serious about security, but it gave a ten-week heads-up to allow time for a workable compromise.

The UAE will probably do most of the compromising, since RIM, which operates in more than 170 countries, won't live or die based on access to the Emirates. The UAE simply doesn't represent a large enough piece of RIM's business to persuade the company to set a precedent which other governments will insist on following. RIM can make modest concessions without altering the company's security model, and that's probably what it will do.

It's also possible, though much less likely, that several other countries will follow the UAE's lead, forcing RIM to either fundamentally alter its security model or surrender access to some especially lucrative markets.

The Saudis, who say they will flip the switch later this month, will face much less pressure to compromise. Saudi Arabia remains an oil-based economy, and its leaders have no ambition to compete with the UAE for the chance to host more corporate or financial leaders -- or foreign tourists. And though its population is four times larger than the UAE's, Saudi Arabia has fewer BlackBerry users. Closing the door on RIM will have little impact on the country's business and generate little if any domestic opposition.

But this is not simply a story of authoritarian governments and their drive for control. The world's leading democracies have their own communications-related security concerns. In July, India threatened to ban Blackberry use unless RIM provided Indian security officials with access to data transferred by its secured messaging system. RIM reportedly promised to work toward compromise, and talks continue.

And what would happen if militants coordinated a successful terrorist attack inside the United States using BlackBerry's encrypted technology? Remember the phrase "warrantless wiretapping?" If American media reported that the U.S. government had no access to the communications that terrorists use to kill Americans on U.S. soil, how fast would lawmakers of both parties rush to force open BlackBerry's coded communications?

There are many forms of government, but fear is universal. This is a conflict that political officials and technology companies will be fighting on many fronts and for many years to come.

Hani Sabra is an analyst in Eurasia Group’s Middle East practice.  Willis Sparks is an analyst in the firm’s Global Macro practice.