Eurasia Group's weekly selection of essential reading for the political risk junkie -- presented in no particular order. As always, feel free to give us your feedback or selections by tweeting at us via @EurasiaGroup or @IanBremmer.

"U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa defined by a decade of missteps"

Craig Whitlock, Washington Post

Hindsight is 20-20. In light of recent events in Mali and Algeria, this is an interesting look back on a decade of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Africa. 

"Red Obsessions: Film Business Moves from Hollywood to Asia"

Lars-Olva Beier, Spiegel Online

With China slated to replace North America as the world's #1 film market by 2020, navigating the Chinese market is increasingly difficult -- and necessary.

"Fertility and Immigration"

Jonathan V. Last, Los Angeles Times

There are 38 million people living in America who were born somewhere else. How do global fertility rates shape U.S. immigration -- regardless of policy? 

"North Korea accused of ripping off ‘Call of Duty' in propaganda video"

Ramy Inocencio, CNN

Posting a video of New York in flames? Not cool, North Korea. Using Michael Jackson's "We Are the World" as the background music? For shame. Lifting parts of the video from the latest Call of Duty video game? That's where YouTube draws the line.

"The new capitalists"

The Economist

To understand Kim Jong Un, it's important to put him in historical context. In the post-war era, North and South Korea's economies were roughly on par. Today, output per capita in South Korea is over 17 times that of the North.

Bonus Read

"Daring to Ask the PED Question"

Bill Simmons, Grantland

While it's not political per se, reporting on doping requires a great deal of diplomacy -- especially if you want to make the case that "innocent until proven guilty" does not always apply. This is one of the boldest, most honest pieces of sports journalism you'll ever read.

By Naz Masraff

With civil war in Syria, turmoil in Gaza, Arab Spring aftershocks, and the still simmering conflict over Iran's nuclear program competing for headlines, it's easy for outsiders to overlook another of the region's most intractable ethnic conflicts-Turkey's internal battle with Kurdish separatists. This story deserves attention, because it remains the primary security threat inside the region's most politically modern and economically dynamic country.

First, some background. In 2010, Turkey began secret talks with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, a militant group better known by its acronym PKK. But in the run-up to June 2011 elections, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan brought them to a halt. Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) won those elections, securing nearly half the popular vote and a third successive term in power, and the newly emboldened prime minister has since adopted a relentlessly hardline attitude on Kurdish questions with a pledge to use Turkey's military to crush the PKK.

Since the beginning of 2011, several thousand Kurdish nationalists have been arrested on charges of PKK membership. In October, public prosecutors in Ankara launched a judicial investigation into the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).

In July, the PKK launched a new phase in its 28-year insurgency, intensifying attacks on Turkey's security forces and working to create "no go" zones in designated areas in the mountains near Turkey's border with Iraq. The stated goal is to intensify pressure on Turkey's government to introduce greater Kurdish language rights and to cede many of the powers of the central government to local Kurdish authorities in southeast Turkey in a process Kurdish nationalists call ‘democratic autonomy.'

The PKK scored territorial gains in August and early September and have held on to some of them, and it's clear that the PKK is now stronger than at any time since the 1990s.

Military activity has slowed since mid-October when the mountain passes along its main infiltration and supply routes became blocked with snow. But the PKK then continued its progress by launching a series of hunger strikes inside Turkish prisons, beginning in September with 63 Kurdish inmates. The number of hunger strikers quickly grew to nearly 700 people, including seven members of parliament. Strikers demanded an end to the ban on the use of Kurdish language in courts and as the primary language used by teachers in schools in the predominantly Kurdish southeast. They also called for respect for Kurds' democratic rights and an end to the isolation of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan, who has been incarcerated on the prison island of Imrali since 1999. In late October, Kurdish nationalist organizations began staging protest rallies across the country, triggering clashes between demonstrators and police, and fights between ethnic Kurds and Turkish ultranationalists in western Turkey. Turkish media, wary of antagonizing the government, downplayed the growing violence-though a few incidents injured too many people to ignore. 

Turkey's government was slow to react, at least publicly, and downplayed the strikes. Speaking in October during a visit to Germany, Erdogan insisted that only one of the hunger strikes was authentic and that others were mainly "for show."

Behind the scenes, however, Turkish officials knew they had a growing problem to contain. The PKK now appears to have won concessions on the right of Kurds to defend themselves in court in their native language-that's expected to be adopted in parliament soon-and a step has been taken to eliminate  Ocalan's isolation, in part by granting his family a visit. This brought an appeal from Ocalan to halt the hunger strikes, and on Sunday, they came to an end.

Yet, the risk of violence continues, and the turmoil in Syria has complicated matters further. Syrian forces have withdrawn from Kurdish areas in northern Syria, creating a de facto autonomous Kurdish regime over the past few months, and PKK leaders can exploit this power vacuum. For the moment, Turkish authorities want to avoid direct military involvement in Syria's troubles, but a sustained wave of PKK attacks on Turkey's security forces from inside Syria might still change their minds.

If the longer-term underlying issues fueling Kurdish separatism can be resolved, it is only with a comprehensive political process. Yet, Turkey's government -- like governments around the world -- is unwilling to negotiate with militants while they continue to launch attacks. This is particularly the case as Turks may go to the polls as many as four times in the next three years, including for a referendum on the constitution, as well as for local, presidential, and parliamentary elections. On the eve of these polls, the government is likely to adopt increasingly nationalistic rhetoric, shying away from taking steps to resolve the Kurdish issue through democratic means.

In short, the hunger strikes have ended, and the protests may die down. But there will be no peace in Turkey's southeast until the two sides can compromise their way toward a lasting political settlement.

Naz Masraff is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Europe practice.

By Philippe de Pontet

The Aug. 26 car bombing of a U.N. building in the Nigerian capital of Abuja, which killed more than twenty people and wounded dozens more, suggests that the Islamist militant group Boko Haram may be in cahoots with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This sobering development constitutes President Goodluck Jonathan's most acute political and security challenge yet. If he responds decisively, he could further alienate northerners who resent his rule and would consider a poorly managed crackdown a provocation targeting Muslim communities. If he proceeds too cautiously, he risks frustrating his southern, largely Christian political base while reinforcing his image as an indecisive "accidental president." Either way, Jonathan's unlikely to come out a winner.

While headquartered in Nigeria's economically depressed northeast, Boko Haram (whose Hausa name translates roughly to "Western education is sinful") has steadily expanded its geographical reach, targets, and tactics since 2009. After the group's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed by Nigerian forces that July, Boko Haram got busy establishing mosques, schools, and other institutions throughout the north while stepping up its attacks on government targets. When Jonathan, a Christian from the southern Niger Delta, assumed the presidency, the group's ambitions became national in scope. And the latest attack indicates that the militants' struggle has become somewhat international, with all the hallmarks of an al Qaeda connection.

So far, the Jonathan administration has responded cautiously to the car bombing. For days it delayed confirming Boko Haram's role, even after the group claimed responsibility for the attack both online and in a press briefing. The government's tactic may prove shrewd, given that Nigeria's electorate is divided along highly charged regional lines and many northern community leaders, politicians, and imams are worried that innocent Muslim civilians could suffer from a heavy-handed government response.

On the other hand, the administration's response could be the product of paralysis and indecision. And those who see it that way -- particularly southern Christians who consider the Islamist movement a growing national menace -- are calling for retribution and a show of force. A handful of prominent northern leaders, including presidential runner-up Muhamadu Buhari, have also called for a swift response.

Caught in the middle as he is, Jonathan will likely try to strike a balance between hawkish military and police action aimed at weakening Boko Haram's base and increased funding for compliant northern governors. The first prong of his approach will be to beef up security in Abuja, Kano, and other urban centers and launch targeted military offensives on suspected militant hideouts. If bungled, such a campaign could spark a backlash against Jonathan, and possibly a recruiting bonanza for Boko Haram. The second prong of the approach will likely be to funnel funding through northern governors to help ameliorate underlying grievances such as grinding poverty and high youth unemployment. But this won't be possible without a prolonged period of legislative debate, which could further calcify the country's regional fault lines. And unlike the rebels of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Boko Haram's absolutist ambitions may not be amenable to political negotiation or payoffs.

Philippe de Pontet is director of Eurasia Group's Africa practice.

By David Bender and Jonathan Tepperman

Since last Friday's near-miss terror attack, when a Saudi tip-off revealed the presence of two bombs making their way by air freight from Yemen to the United States, much nervous speculation has focused on two issues. The first is the supposed sophistication of the sender, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the two year old Yemen-based franchise of the international terror group. Second is the likelihood that Yemen may be quickly collapsing into a Somalia-style failed state, which would allow AQAP to operate there unchecked.

Reports on the technical complexity of the bombs themselves -- which were disguised as printer cartridges and made it past (admittedly insufficient) cargo shipment screening  -- bolster the first point. Much of the conversation has also focused on Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), the malleable military-grade high explosive used in these most recent attempts, as well as in the aborted 2009 Christmas Day underwear bombing (also attributed to AQAP in Yemen). Such components mean that "these bombs have the hallmark of a higher degree of professionalism that we've ever seen come out of al Qaeda before," according to Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer in the Middle East.

Is Yemen the next Somalia? The debate over Yemen's fragility is framed by the severe challenges facing the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh: tribal rebellion in the north, secessionist pressures in the south, and a dysfunctional economy marred by rampant corruption and dwindling oil and water resources. On top of all that is AQAP, which is now aiming its guns on the government: the group has killed 70 police officers and soldiers in the past four weeks.

Taking a closer look at both of these concerns -- in Baer's words a "new, more dangerous wave of terrorism" in the United States and impending disintegration in Yemen -- reveals that both are overstated. It's not that AQAP isn't worth worrying about. But the danger is not quite on the level of catastrophe.

For example, while AQAP has made several attempts at striking targets abroad -- printer cartridges, explosive underwear, and in one case, a bomb stuffed inside the bomber himself -- so far, all of these plans have failed.

While all of these attacks could have had devastating consequences if they actually succeeded, they pale in comparison to the sort of mega-strikes  al Qaeda central has pulled off. The Pakistan-based major league outfit is known for meticulous planning, simultaneous strikes (like the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania), and monumental targets (such as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon). The Yemeni team, judging by its track record, relies on eager but untrained volunteers and luck to hit its much smaller objectives. This scattershot approach may make future attacks more difficult to uncover and stop. But it also means the organization is unlikely to succeed -- and that even if it does, the attacks won't have anywhere near the international impact of 9/11.

While Washington may not yet understand AQAP very well or its place in Yemen's complex political and tribal matrix, Saudi intelligence seems to have effectively penetrated the organization. The Saudis have been watching the group carefully since the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al Qaeda merged and started targeting Riyadh. And the Saudi efforts have paid off. The key role the Saudis played in disrupting the recent bomb attempts suggests that the kingdom's intelligence either has human assets in AQAP or at least has gained the ability to monitor its communications. As a result, Western and allied intelligence organizations have far more insight into this branch than they do into its Pakistan-based sponsor.

As for Yemen, there are good reasons not to count it out quite yet. Yes, the country's long-term prognosis is grim. But Saleh is a wily operator who has stayed in power for 32 years by relying on bribes, tribal manipulations, kidnappings, and military force. For the next few years, at least, Washington and Riyadh -- both acutely aware of the risks the country's collapse would pose -- will not abandon him. On the contrary, they'll keep supporting Yemen with generous financial and military aid. Of course, Sanaa must be careful how it proceeds. The United States and Saudi Arabia are the object of much hostility among Yemeni public. Public exposure of U.S. military counterterrorism operations killing Yemenis (as when the Bush administration leaked a U.S .operation in Yemen in 2002) could end up weakening Saleh's position and boosting AQAP's popularity.

AQAP is plenty dangerous and a failed Yemeni state is a big risk -- eventually. But Yemen is not yet in crisis and this is not the worst terrorist threat the United States has faced.

David Bender is an analyst in Eurasia Group's Middle East practice. Jonathan Tepperman is Eurasia Group's Managing Editor and a columnist at TheAtlantic.com.

By Ian Bremmer

When Yemen makes international headlines, it's usually because outsiders look at the unrest there as yet another proxy conflict between regional heavyweights Saudi Arabia and Iran. It's one more version of the Sunni vs. Shia Middle East story. The Saudis are supporting Yemen's government in a fight with Shia Houthi rebels financed and trained by Iran. The Saudi, Yemeni, and Iranian governments each have their motives for feeding this simplification.

The Houthis are a Shia rebel group in northern Yemen, centered in the city of Saada. They've warned for years that they've been politically and economically marginalized by Yemen's government, and Houthi rebels launched a rebellion in 2004. There have been six rounds of fighting since. In August of this year, the Yemeni government, with Saudi support, launched another battle against the Houthis, and the conflict has spilled across the border into Saudi Arabia, where Houthis have fought pitched firefights with Saudi forces. In response, the Saudis have launched bombing raids on Houthi positions inside northern Yemen. Tens of thousands of people have fled the expanding conflict zone.

The spike in violence is now getting the regional attention it deserves-but for the wrong reasons. Yemen's weak government already has its hands full with a growing threat from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and increasing secessionist pressures in the south, adding to the risk that Yemen will become a failed state. The refugee problem is creating a risk of social unrest inside Saudi Arabia. These are serious issues. Less serious is the fear, fanned by both Saudi and Iranian officials, that Iran wants to use the Houthis to create an Arabian version of Hizbullah, a direct Shia threat to Saudi territory. The Saudis are playing up this threat to justify cross-border attacks into Yemen. Yemen's government is using the threat to justify its willingness to accept Saudi attacks on Yemeni soil and to gain Western military support and financial help. Iran feeds the story to pose as increasingly influential within the region.

The Houthis, though, have no reason to play along. They follow the Zaidi form of Islam. They're technically Shia, but theologically and historically distinct from Iran's Twelver Shia majority, which has cultural connections in Lebanon and (to a lesser extent) in Iraq -- but not in Yemen. The Houthi rebels need guns and cash and can't be picky about where they get them. If Iran is willing to sell, they're willing to buy. That doesn't mean they will use them to advance Iranian interests in Saudi Arabia's backyard.

In Yemen, at least, all militancy is local. Few outside al Qaeda relish the idea of the world's largest oil-producer sharing a border with a failed state. That's a risk worth worrying about, but it's not a good reason to over-simplify a complex political, economic, ethnic, religious, and social problem into some sort of regional proxy war between Sunni and Shia.

KHALED FAZAA/AFP/Getty Images