Note: Today is the first in a series of posts that detail Eurasia Group's Top Risks for 2013.

Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, investors and companies have focused mainly on risks in developed world markets. But as conditions in the U.S. and Europe continue to improve in 2013, the most worrisome risks will again come from emerging market countries. These countries are fundamentally less stable than their developed world counterparts, and some of their governments used a period of favorable commodities prices and the benefits from earlier reform to avoid the tough choices needed to reach the next stage of their political and economic development.

Some of these emerging market nations face more difficult challenges than others, and much depends on the degree of political capital each leader will have in order to make unpopular but necessary changes. These countries can be divided into three broad categories according to the complexity and immediacy of the risks they face and the longer-term upside they offer.

The first category includes the best bets:

• Mexico: Newly elected President Enrique Peña Nieto is one of the few leaders of an emerging market country both willing and able to advance structural economic reforms.

• Turkey: Despite unrest near its borders and elite infighting over constitutional change, Turkey's institutions and balance of power support a stable and dynamic economy.

• South Korea: Seoul has demonstrated an ability to diversify its trade partnerships, has concluded free trade agreements with the U.S., the EU, and ASEAN, and is negotiating similar deals with Canada, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The second category of emerging market economies are at risk of considerable volatility.

• India: Regardless of significant long-term structural and demographic advantages, dysfunctional politics and upcoming elections will probably paralyze reform efforts.

• Indonesia: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is a lame duck, and the economic reform process is stalling.

• Thailand: Elites in Bangkok continue to fight over unresolved issues, generating unrest.

• South Africa: Political leadership has deteriorated steadily since Nelson Mandela's 1999 retirement, and populist pressures are increasing.

• China: The government's continued focus on social welfare, infrastructure, and industrial policy spending in 2013 will help bolster near-term growth. But geopolitical tensions and more competitive Chinese firms will make it more difficult for foreign companies and investors to secure profits.

Lastly, there are the underperformers, those countries where risks will overshadow returns.

• Russia: President Vladimir Putin retains a strong hold on power, but he has lost significant support from upper- and middle-class Russians, particularly in major urban areas. As a result, reliance on support from conservative Russians and economic elites will likely reduce his willingness to undertake needed reforms. Relations with both Europe and the U.S. are increasingly troubled.

• Pakistan: Political risk could reach critical levels due to a volatile election season.

• Venezuela: Challenges to restore economic health will probably suffer without the dynamic presence of the recently re-elected, but seriously ill, President Hugo Chavez.

• Argentina: Policymaking challenges are widespread due to populist pressure.

On Friday, we'll profile Risk #2: China vs Information.

By Naz Masraff

The recent move to breathe new life into Turkey's stalled EU accession process is unlikely to have much effect beyond providing Ankara with a minor domestic and international public relations boost. On 17 May, Turkey's EU minister and chief negotiator Egemen Bagis and European Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Fule launched what they dubbed a positive agenda for EU-Turkish relations. The agenda introduces new mechanisms for communication, including specific working groups, intended to accelerate Turkey's compliance with the acquis communitaire in eight chapters, including two that are blocked for political reasons. But the efforts are insufficient to counter the underlying structural problems impeding Turkey's now long-stalled EU accession.

Turkish authorities have not opened any new chapters of the EU acquis since 2010; talks on 18 of the 34 chapters cannot move ahead because of political issues and open ones cannot be provisionally closed. An important obstacle continues to be Turkey's failure to move on politically difficult reforms needed to bring the country's laws in line with European standards, especially on the judiciary and fundamental rights. Bagis's statements suggesting that Turkey would be in full compliance with the EU acquis by 2014 are largely political rhetoric with little substance.

Cyprus is a huge stumbling block. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has decided not to call a follow-up international conference on Cyprus because there has been no advance since the January talks on the issue. This makes it impossible for the conflict to be resolved before July, when the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) government assumes the EU presidency. Turkey will freeze its relations with the EU presidency for six months in protest, though contacts with the European Commission and the European Parliament will continue.

The RoC's exploration for hydrocarbons in the eastern Mediterranean has exacerbated its contentious relations with Turkey. Turkey claims some areas included in the RoC's new licensing round for further explorations extend onto Turkey's continental shelf, and that any revenues must be shared with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). While the dispute is not likely to escalate into a military conflict, Turkey may continue its gunboat diplomacy, further intensifying tensions. Turkey is now also considering fallback options including pressing other Muslim states to recognize the TRNC.

The new agenda may not result in major advances on EU accession, but it will give the Turkish government some advantages. Ankara can secure public recognition from the EU and boost its domestic popularity even when minor steps are taken. The effort also has bureaucratic advantages, providing another way for both the Turkish Ministry for EU Affairs and the European Commission's Turkey desk, the largest desk operating under the Directorate-General for Enlargement, to justify their existence.

Naz Masraff is an associate with Eurasia Group's Europe Practice.

By Wolfango Piccoli

Recent opinion polls suggest that Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) is on course to win a third successive term with a comfortable parliamentary majority at the June 12 general elections. However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears unlikely to achieve his goal of securing the 367 seats necessary to modify the constitution without a referendum. That result would set the stage for an acrimonious political struggle in the aftermath of the election given the AKP's apparent determination to change the constitution and increase the powers of the president. Such volatility could hamper efforts to boost the economy, while also impeding Turkish efforts to boost its international reputation.

Opinion polls show support for the AKP is running at 45-48 percent, ahead of the Republican People's Party (CHP) at 25-28 percent and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) at 12-14 percent. However, the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is expected to perform strongly in predominantly Kurdish areas. Its candidates are running as independents in order to sidestep a requirement that political parties win at least 10 percent of the national vote in order to win representation in parliament. The BDP could take around 25 seats, up from 19 in the current parliament.

When combined with the expected improvement in the performance of the CHP, the increase in the number of BDP deputies is likely to mean that the AKP will need at least 50 percent of the popular vote in order to win the same number of seats as it did in 2007. If voting tracks the current opinion polls, the AKP is likely to win around 310-335 seats. While this is a comfortable majority (276 votes are required for a simple majority), it is far short of the supermajority it is looking for. The only real way the AKP could win the supermajority is if the MHP falls below the 10 percent threshold and fails to obtain representation in parliament and if the BDP performs poorly in the southeast.

The AKP, however, appears determined to attempt constitutional reform. Its election manifesto, announced on April 16, declares that its first priority will be a new constitution. EU accession efforts, however, are effectively dead. Erdogan has made it clear that he wants to replace the current parliamentary system with a presidential one. He is then expected to attempt to win that post for two consecutive five-year terms.

Even if Erdogan fails to introduce a presidential system, a new constitution could still provoke volatility. Kurdish nationalists are demanding that it eliminate any mention of Turkish ethnicity. Any such initiative would provoke a furious reaction both from opposition Turkish nationalists and the Turkish nationalist wing of the AKP. Similarly, any attempt to amend the first four clauses of the current constitution -- theoretically unalterable -- would result in mass protests from Kemalists and a possible application to the Constitutional Court for the new draft to be annulled.

If, as seems likely, the AKP does not secure the hoped-for supermajority, politics in Turkey after the June election will almost instantly focus on the constitutional referendum and take the government's focus away from pressing economic issues and its efforts to boost the country's international profile.

Wolfango Piccoli is a director with Eurasia Group's Europe Practice. 

For more than half a century, relations between Israel and Turkey have provided a degree of stability in the turbulent politics of the Middle East. Turkey was among the first majority-Muslim states to recognize Israel in 1948, and the two countries have profited from bilateral trade and military cooperation ever since. Unfortunately for Israel, things are changing.

It's not that current tensions between them will destroy their commercial relationship. Turkey remains Israel's top trade partner in the region. Nor is it that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led government will move Turkey into some sort of anti-Israeli alliance with Iran and Syria. Turkey remains a member of NATO. And though accession talks on European Union membership are going nowhere, neither side wants to abandon efforts to bring Turkey and Europe closer together.

Yet, there's a change underway in Turkey's regional role, a shift rooted in the country's bitter internal politics, and it's not one that Israel will like. Erdogan and the AKP have seen their popularity eroded over time as the party's battle with Turkey's secularist establishment in the military, business community, and media has polarized the political class and dominated the country's agenda. But like so many leaders over time and around the world, Erdogan has discovered that foreign-policy accomplishments that raise a country's international profile can bolster a government's standing at home.

Recent international developments have added to Turkey regional clout. The U.S. regional presence is waning as U.S. troops are rapidly withdrawn from Iraq. Europe is too fully occupied with problems within the Eurozone to take up the slack as Washington redeploys. Regional players like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are distracted to some degree by questions of political succession. It will be years before Iraq's government has the self-confidence to play its traditional regional role. Though Iran's government has forced the opposition off the streets, the turmoil of the past year has done lasting damage.

This leaves Turkey in a strong position. It's one of very few countries with influence in both Washington and Tehran. Expectations for robust economic growth -- the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecasts an average of 6.7 percent per year between 2011 and 2017 -- bolster the government's self-confidence and the country's reputation as a rising regional powerbroker. 

This is bad news for Israel. At Davos in January 2009, Erdogan won widespread praise among critics of Israel by storming off stage following a heated exchange over Gaza with Israeli President Shimon Peres. This spring, Turkey burnished its geopolitical credentials by joining Brazil in a plan to end the international standoff over Iran's nuclear program -- and in voting no on U.S. and European-sponsored U.N. sanctions on Tehran. When an Israeli raid on a flotilla of ships trying to break a blockade of supplies to Gaza killed nine Turkish activists last month, Erdogan again won international applause by denouncing the attack as a "bloody massacre."

The risk is real that Erdogan will make good on threats to cut off diplomatic relations with Israel. There's not much Israel can do about it, and officials in Tel Aviv are mainly downplaying the problem to avoid making matters worse for economic relations. But they know well that Erdogan is looking to play a higher-profile, more independent role in Middle East politic -- and that Turkey is a friend that Israel can ill afford to lose.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?