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Can Beijing save the Taiwanese president?

By Nicholas Consonery
During the next six months or so, as leaders in Beijing and Taipei see their window of opportunity shrinking, they will make a concerted push toward remedying one of the world's major geopolitical dilemmas. Both sides will work feverishly to expand economic ties-in the hopes of strengthening Tawainese President Ma Ying-jeou's domestic standing and staving off a rebound for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Ma's political strength hemorrhaged in August when Typhoon Morakot created a humanitarian and public relations disaster, leaving 700 dead or missing. Now, the president's approval ratings remain below 30% and the DPP looks set to regain some strength.
When he was elected last year, President Ma had already become a relative darling in Beijing by promising to focus on the economics of the cross-strait relationship, without addressing the politics. Beijing was happy to accommodate this approach because it coalesced with the leadership's broader plan to secure sovereignty over the island through gradual economic integration. With hardliners in Beijing threatening to undermine Chinese President Hu Jintao's Taiwan policy after a tumultuous eight-year presidency of DPP member Chen Shui-bian, progress was needed quickly.
Concessions began in the months after Ma's election, as charter flights and other tourism channels between the two sides were expanded. Later, in April 2009, the first-ever direct corporate investment from China into Taiwan was announced, with mainland telecom giant China Mobile planning to purchase a 12% stake Taiwan's Far EasTone. The next day, Taiwan's domestic market jumped nearly 7%. In following days, then Minister of Economic Affairs Yiin Chii-ming announced that Chinese investments would soon be allowed into 99 Taiwanese business sectors.
But political troubles for President Ma are making Beijing concerned that all this progress could be for naught. The president's popularity ratings had already fallen precipitously during the global financial crisis. Now, with the mishandling of the Morakot disaster, Beijing fears that Ma's reelection prospects in 2012 may be imperiled. Certainly things seem to be trending downward for Ma and his Kuomintang (KMT) political party, and based on recent experience, Beijing dreads a resurgence of the more confrontational DPP.
As a result, China will be handing out economic concessions to Taiwan in the next six months, hoping that they will bolster Ma's prospects. For his part, Ma will happily accept, fearing a stronger opposition and believing that he can regain some political strength by improving commercial ties with the mainland and boosting Taiwan's growth prospects. The big deliverable could be an economic cooperation framework agreement, which would set the stage for a significant expansion in economic ties, investment, and trade flows. Negotiators for both sides are purportedly working for an agreement by early next year, and rumors are swirling that President Hu himself is calling for a deal. More cross-strait corporate activity looks likely, perhaps including chances for Chinese firms to invest in Taiwan's leading tech industries, though this will face popular resistance on the island. A planned memorandum on financial cooperation, which will allow mutual investments in the banking sector, also looks set to be signed by early December.
On the political stage in Taiwan, Ma recognizes that the DPP's growing strength will make concessions to the mainland more contentious heading into 2010, motivating him to accomplish as much as possible before then. Although recent polling indicates general disgust with both parties, the opposition is positioning itself to rebound from recent lows by increasing its representation in local government and in the island's legislature. Two weeks ago, a DPP candidate won a by-election for a seat in the legislature to represent the second district of western Yulin County. While KMT-affiliated candidates split the vote, affording the DPP candidate an easy win, the victory left the opposition just one vote short of holding one-fourth of the total seats in the legislature. The DPP could also gain more representation during local mayor and magistrate elections on 5 December, which would be a blow to Ma and his KMT party.
The DPP stands a decent chance of securing one-fourth representation in the legislature in the next few months, as another by-election must be held in Nantou County before 10 December for the seat abandoned by Wu Den-yih, who was installed as premier in September. This would give the DPP more leverage in combating the KMT's majority coalition in the legislature. The DPP would also be able to propose recalls of the president, a political move that would be easily blocked by the dominant KMT. But such infighting would steal the domestic news cycle, distracting Ma from his strategic and economic goals, and causing more than a little heartburn in Beijing.
Nicholas Consonery is an Asia Analyst at Eurasia Group.
Andrew Wong/Getty Images)






Hmmm....
Watching Ma's freefall in the polls has definitely been enjoyable for those of us who love Taiwan and support its democracy and long-term economic growth....
Nicholas, I think you've got some misunderstandings here...
(1)Ma is not unpopular simply because he is incompetent and because of the economy; it is the consistent attitude of the Administration that it really doesn't care what happens to the island, along with the sell out of its sovereignty, that has quietly raised hackles all around the island. Ma could have done well out of the crisis if only he'd strived to give the appearance that his administration was doing something.
(2) China will not grant "economic concessions" -- it has never made any concessions to Ma, and has no need to. Note that the missile build up and military build up continues, even though the KMT is serving Beijing in ways both great and petty. The real purpose of China-Taiwan economic agreements in the short-term is to lever the Taiwanese out of cross-strait markets they control, as happened with the early shipping agreements. Beijing flagged the lucrative gravel shipping routes as domestic, then moved Taiwan bottoms out of that market. Now its ships move gravel to Taiwan. The air travel agreements are similarly favorable to Beijing. This has been the pattern, and it will continue to be the pattern. The long term goal of Beijing is to hollow out the island's economy and steal its technology, and then annex Taiwan. ECFA is the first step in this process. Note that in each stage in this process Beijing has taken steps to exclude foreigners from moving into these markets.
Because the KMT has hitched its star to getting agreements with Beijing, Beijing has absolute leverage over it. The DPP bargained hard, which is why Beijing did its best to (mostly successfully) portray the DPP as "confrontational" (thanks for repeating that propaganda) or "radical". In fact Beijing was peeved because the DPP insisted on safeguarding Taiwan. The KMT doesn't, and thus has no leverage over Beijing. Expect more one-sided deals, with plenty of giveaways from the KMT.
(3) To see this process as going on between Beijing and Ma is also erroneous. Ma is despised by KMT party elites, who are conducting China policy out of his control and behind his back. Ma is thus not entirely in control of China policy. One reason he moved to become chairman of the KMT is because his influence was restricted by powerful right-wing elites. Ma himself is a pro-China ideologue with a long history of anti-democracy stands. His strong involvement with Confucian symbolism and aloofness from the people grow out of that ideology.
(4) The DPP is not "more confrontational." That is a bit of pro-Beijing propaganda. The DPP insists on the sovereignty of the island and acts in the interests of Taiwan when makes policy with China. It would never have agreed to give up the markets that the KMT has. Since Beijing determines whether it is "provoked" it essentially has been able to paint the pro-democracy side in Taiwan, and its former corporate lawyer president as a bunch of radicals. The real radicals, who threaten to plunge the region into war and murder Taiwanese wholesale over a political disagreement, sit in Beijing.
Michael Turton
The View from Taiwan blog
Why Doesn't The US Support Taiwanese Independence?
I think the answer to that question is rather clear: China has promised war and the US does not want a war.
But so what? Why should the US back down or shy away from confrontation with China? Is China seriously willing to lose its new found wealth in the world over Taiwan? Does China really care about Taiwan? The second paragraph of the article hits it square on the head. Hu does not really call the shots in Beijing and his and Wen's stance on Taiwan is, I believe, for the sole benefit of the hardliners and the military. To them, Taiwan is just a pesky issue that they both wish would just go away.
To me, I fail to see what is really needs to be "solved". Was Taiwan taken from the Japanese and given to the ROC government after WWII? Yes, by treaty. The PRC took over the mainland and the ROC settled on Taiwan. This is similar (not exactly) to the Korean situation (another as yet unended conflict) The communists settled for the North and the US and allies took the South. A country divided by civil war (I know it is more complex than that) Yet both are readily involved in the international community and recognized as nations (not by each other).
There is the PRC and the ROC. Taiwan has went down its own road for the past 60 years and its too late to turn back progress there. The US and rest of the world should actively support an independent Taiwan.