The good, the bad, and the interesting of Obama's peace prize

Thu, 10/15/2009 - 1:35pm

By Ian Bremmer

Last week was perhaps the most surreal one of Barack Obama's presidency so far. In the midst of a massive internal debate about what to do with a failing war in Afghanistan, he won the Nobel Peace Prize -- a mixed blessing for several reasons.

Domestically, the Nobel creates a problem because it focuses political attention on foreign policy, which is not Obama's strength. To date, the U.S. president hasn't secured any meaningful foreign policy accomplishments. More importantly, foreign policy isn't the part of his presidency that Obama wants to prioritize. Of course, the prize won't damage Obama's approval ratings at home. His initial response to winning the Nobel was suitably modest and low key, and he'll surely dominate airwaves with a rousing speech when he makes his formal acceptance. However broad the criticism, it's hard to blame the president for the fact that the Norwegians apparently really like him. The challenge will arise in December when Obama flies to Oslo. He'll have to talk up his foreign policy agenda, taking critical headline space away from healthcare reform and the U.S. economy.

Internationally, the prize is a bigger boon for the U.S. president. It burnishes Obama's multilateralism, and shines a light on the enthusiasm about his presidency that's been evinced in much of the world -- particularly compared to his predecessor. Most of the constraints on Obama's foreign policy are structural, given the international indifference to global leadership in general. But at the margins, playing to more ebullient crowds around the world should give Obama a bit more policy flexibility with international interlocutors.

To date, Obama's foreign policy has been largely reactive. He hasn't had the time or the inclination to lay out a sweeping worldview -- a more ideological and strategic approach to foreign policy that would be clearly identified as his own. Instead, his administration's foreign policy has been marked by professionalization, with most of the policy formation done at the bureaucratic level. The Nobel acceptance speech calls for more than that, and it's conceivable that we'll see the outlines of an Obama doctrine in it. It's hard to know what gets top priority in such a speech, but clearly democratic values would play a greater role, which so far we've only seen in non-priority areas (such as in Obama's trip to Ghana, which snubbed Nigeria). But if that's true, it could create conflict. A U.S. grand strategy driven by values is less likely to prove as compatible with the "pragmatic growth" approach of Beijing or authoritarian Western allies in the Middle East.

Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group.

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But if that's true, it could

But if that's true, it could create conflict. A U.S. grand strategy driven by values is less likely to prove as compatible with the "pragmatic growth" approach of Beijing or authoritarian Western allies in the Middle East.

It's also more likely to lead to political instability in the areas in question and in terms of their support and loyalty to the US, at least as long as the fundamental strategic under-pinnings of our alliances - preserving stability and oil production in the Middle East, in particular - stay the same.

Witness what happened to Carter, when he pressured the Shah to loosen up on human rights and so forth. Even the leaders of Iran have admitted the belief that if the Shah had come down early and hard on the revolutionary movement, he probably could have crushed it in its infancy. Now, driving the Shah to democratization might have been beneficial in other ways . . . except that the US wanted to have its cake and eat it too; we wanted a more democratic Iran so we could feel good, but also an Iran with the same goals as authoritarian Iran so we could keep a position we liked in terms of alliance and oil stability. You can't have it both ways, and in the end the US got neither.*

*In fact, I'd argue that a values-centered foreign policy can be a dangerous distraction from a President's primary job, which is to promote the interests and welfare of his state in foreign policy affairs. If these values become ends in of themselves, then it takes away from that goal - he becomes Proselyter-in-Chief.